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The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in
Individual Rights Cases: Michael Perry's
Constitutional Theory and Beyond
Daniel 0. Conkle*
Today's conclusion by five Justices . . . is nothing other than a bald
substitution of individual subjective moral values for those of the
legislature. 1

Such a judicial substitution of moral values is precisely
what Professor Michael J. Perry advocates in his recent book,
The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights.2 Relying not
at all on the text or history of the Constitution, Perry formulates a functional justification for constitutional policy making
in individual-rights cases, policy making by an unelected judiciary without reference to the intentions of those who framed
the Constitution. He fashions the Supreme Court as a "moral
prophet," beckoning the populace toward an ultimate realization of the morally correct answers to individual-rights questions, and he develops a theory of political accountability in an
attempt to reconcile this broad judicial role with established
democratic principles. Perry's is a forceful book, and his eloquent and lucid arguments no doubt will persuade many of the
efficacy and propriety of his version of judicial review.3
* Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
I wish to thank Patrick Baude, Craig Bradley, Deborah Conkle, Maurice Holland, and Michael Perry for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this
Article; Rebecca Craft for her research assistance; and Indiana University and
its School of Law for the financial support they provided for my work.
1. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. CL 3001, 3022 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
see infra note 222 and accompanying text.
2. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982); see also Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and
Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261 (1981) (prior version of chapter 3);
Perry, NoninterpretiveReview in Human Rights Cases: A FunctionalJustification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (1981) (prior version of chapter 4).
3. Perry's work has been applauded as "the most powerful and compelling" recent effort to establish a functional justification for constitutional policy making by the judiciary. See Saphire, Making Noninterpretivism
Respectable: Michael J. Perry's Contributions to Constitutional Theory (Book
Review), 81 MICH. L. REV. 782, 800 (1983).
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I remain unpersuaded. In my view, Perry's model of judicial review not only fails to justify constitutional law making
beyond the framers' intentions, but in fact would lead to a virtual elimination of the judicial role that Perry wishes to uphold
and expand. I am convinced that Perry-style review would undermine, rather than support, the fragile legitimacy that attaches to Supreme Court pronouncements of constitutional law;
shorn of that legitimacy, the Court's constitutional decisions
would face all-but-certain popular repudiation, and the Court's
powerful voice would fall to a whisper.
Despite the ultimate failure of his overall theory, however,
Perry's work contributes important new ideas to the ongoing
debate concerning the legitimacy of judicial review. He published his thoughts "to help advance the conversation of constitutional theory,"4 and in that venture his success cannot be
questioned.5 In this Article, I join the conversation. Building
upon the strengths of Perry's work and attempting to avoid its
weaknesses, I present my own thoughts on judicial review, advancing an alternative theory to support the legitimacy of the
Supreme Court's recognition of constitutional rights beyond
those mandated by the framers.
Part I of this Article discusses the issue of legitimacy-the
problem of reconciling judicial review with our society's basic
commitment to majoritarian policy making. It outlines two
4. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at x.
5. Perry's book already has spawned a symposium on constitutional theory. See Judicial Review and the Constitution-The Text and Beyond, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 443 (1983). For other discussions of Perry's book, see Holland, JudicialActivism vs. Restraint: McDowell, Miller, and Perry Reconsider
the Debate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 705; Tepker, JudicialReview and
Moral Progress: Searchingfor the Better Angels of Our Nature, 37 OKLA. L.
REV. 269 (1984); Auerbach, Book Review, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 137 (1984);
Denvir, The New Constitutional Law (Book Review), 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 139
(1983); Konvitz, Book Review, 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 724 (1983); Kristol, The
Heavenly City of Post-ConstitutionalConstitutional Theory (Book Review), 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (1984); Lynch, Constitutional Law as Moral Philosophy
(Book Review), 84 COLUM. L. REV. 537 (1984); Morris, Interpretive and
Noninterpretive Constitutional Theory (Book Review), 94 ETHICS 501 (1984);
Nichol, Giving Substance Its Due (Book Revew), 93 YALE L.J. 171 (1983);
O'Sullivan, Book Review, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 380 (1985); Rabkin, The Charismatic Constitution (Book Review), PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1983, at 142; Rohr,
Book Review, 1 J.L. & RELIGION 249 (1983); Sager, What's a Nice Court Like
You Doing in a Democracy Like This? (Book Review), 36 STAN. L. REV. 1087
(1984); Saphire, supra note 3; Thomson, An Endless but Productive Dialogue:
Some Reflections on Efforts to Legitimize JudicialReview (Book Review), 61
TEX. L. REV. 743 (1982); Wellington, History and Morals in ConstitutionalAdjudication (Book Review), 97 HARV. L. REV. 326 (1983),
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broad theoretical positions on the legitimate scope of judicial
review: the "originalist" position, which contends that the
Supreme Court must limit itself to values present in the original understanding of the Constitution; and the "nonoriginalist"
position, which asserts that the Court is not so limited.
Part II summarizes and evaluates Perry's theory of nonoriginalist review. It explores Perry's contention that nonoriginalist review serves a crucial function in American society
and describes and criticizes Perry's model of review, according
to which the Supreme Court would decide issues based on the
justices' personal moral values. It also examines, but rejects,
Perry's method of reconciling his theory with the principle of
majoritarian consent.
In Part III, I advance my own theory of judicial review. I
contend that nonoriginalist review can indeed serve a critical
function, but only if the Supreme Court draws its decisional
norms from an external source that keeps faith with the
Court's judicial office-a source I call the pattern of American
moral development. I then attempt to reconcile my model with
the principle of consent, and I examine why this model may
well satisfy the American people's need for and perceptions
about the Supreme Court's exercise of nonoriginalist review.
I. THE ISSUE OF LEGITIMACY
Our democracy rests on the fundamental proposition that
governmental actions derive their legitimacy6 from the consent
of the governed or, more specifically, from the consent of a majority of those governed.7 This basic principle formed the explicit basis for the Declaration of Independence,8 and its vitality
6. As I use the term, "legitimacy" implies something more than an institution's power to enforce its decisions. Rather, legitimacy implies authority:
the institution ought to be obeyed because its decisions, in terms of their substance or at least the process by which they are formed, are right, proper, and
morally justified. Cf. . BELLAH, THE BROKEN CoVENANT. AwRICAN CIVIL
RELIGION IN TmM OF TRIAL 142 (1975) ("It is the nature of a republic that its
citizens must love it, not merely obey it."). See generally Tushnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles 96
HARV. L. REv. 781, 807-08 (1983) (discussing empirical and normative aspects
of legitimacy). I therefore disagree with those who proclaim that "power
rather than law is supreme," see Miller, Toward a Definition of "The" Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 633, 650 (1983), or that "law is no more than the
exercise of power," see Nowak, ResurrectingRealist Jurisprudence: The Political Bias of Burger CourtJustices, 17 SUFFoLK U.L. REv. 549, 550 (1983).
7. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1980).
8. The Declaration of Independence provides, in relevant part, that
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remains undisturbed. Not surprisingly, most constitutional theorists, in one way or another, have accepted this principle as a
given. 9
When the Supreme CourtlO exercises judicial review in the
individual-rights context," however, its function is distinctly
countermajoritarian. For the Court to recognize constitutional
rights is for it to annul the challenged legislative or executive
actions, actions taken, at least presumptively, with majoritarian
consent. 12 Moreover, not only is the Court countermanding
"[g]overnments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the
Consent of the Governed." The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S.
1776).
See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
16-20 (1962); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1980); J. ELY, supra note 7, at 4-7; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3
9.

COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS

(1971). Professor Perry reduces the principle to one of electoral accountability, which he takes as "axiomatic." See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 9-10; infra
note 61 and accompanying text; cf. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: JudicialReview and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049,
1089 (1979) ("Initially, we both cherished and mistrusted legislative rule, and
we continue to do so.") (footnote omitted). But cf.Wellington, The Nature of
Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 486-99 (1982) (arguing that American adherence to the principle of majoritarian rule is much less consistent than most
theorists assume).
10. This Article focuses on the United States Supreme Court. Other federal and state courts, however, also make constitutional decisions, and much of
the discussion would apply to those courts as well. See generally M. PERRY,
supra note 2, at 4 & nn. 17-19 (discussing the preeminence of the Supreme
Court in American jurisprudence and the special issues raised by state-court
constitutional policy making).
11. The individual-rights questions giving rise to judicial review typically
relate to the Bill of Rights or the fourteenth amendment. The exercise of judicial review outside the context of individual rights raises different issues.
See generally id.at 37-60 (discussing federalism and the separation of governmental powers).
12. The Court's function is not countermajoritarian, at least not in the
same sense, when it interprets statutes or formulates rules of common law. As
traditionally understood, the Court in these circumstances acts to give effect to
legislative intentions or to create law where the legislature has been silent.
See J. ELY, supra note 7, at 4; Wellington, supra note 9,at 487. But cf. W.
Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation 4 (1984) (urging a
collaborative model of statutory interpretation, according to which "sovereignty does not reside in the legislature alone but in a process of dialogue between the courts and the legislature in which interpretive criteria are never
completely dictated by the legislature") (unpublished manuscript on file with
Professor Conkle) (footnotes omitted). In any event, the legislature can countermand the Court's statutory and common-law decisions by enacting statutes
to clarify its intentions or to replace the Court's common-law rules. The principle of majoritarian consent remains intact. See generally J. ELY, supra note
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preexisting majoritarian decisions, but the Court itself lacks a
majoritarian mandate.13 Supreme Court justices, of course, are
not elected, but rather serve lifetime appointments,14 and their
decisions are not subject to any direct popular control. Accordingly, the question of legitimacy is readily apparent: by what
right does the Court exercise this power of judicial review, a
power that seems so dramatically inconsistent with the principle of majoritarian consent?'5
A noncontroversial source of authority for judicial review
is the Constitution, as understood by its framers.16 Thus, the

Supreme Court acts with unquestionable legitimacy when it
gives effect to individual rights specifically decreed by the Constitution, either through its unambiguous language or as that
language was originally understood.17 In these instances, judi7, at 4 (noting that in nonconstitutional contexts, courts merely stand in for
the legislature and can be overruled by ordinary statutes). But cf.Wellington,
supra note 9 (arguing that there is a close relationship between constitutional
and nonconstitutional judicial decision making).
13. Cf L.TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 48 (1978) (stating that
judicial review is "doubly suspect").
14. See U.S. CONST. art. H,§ 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST.art. M, § 1.
15. But cf. Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An
Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEx. L REv.
1207 (1984) (arguing that the crucial question is not whether judicial review
can be reconciled with the principle of majoritarian consent, but rather how
much discretion the Supreme Court should have in determining the meaning
of the Constitution).
16. The Constitution and its various amendments, of course, were adopted
by different persons at different points in time. When I speak generally of
"the Constitution," I include its amendments. Moreover, when I refer to "the
framers" of the original constitutional text or of any amendment, I mean both
the officials who voted to propose the enactment and those who voted to ratify
it.

17. The issue is not quite as simple as I make it appear. It is one thing to
say that the framers' intentions concerning individual rights should be given
effect. It is something else to say that the Supreme Court, and not elected officials, should be the final arbiter of majoritarian compliance with those intentions.
Nonetheless, the legitimacy of this form of judicial review is not difficult
to defend. The constitutional text itself provides support for the practice,
although the language is hardly definitive. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1
(the judicial power extends to all cases "arising under this Constitution"); U.S.
CoNsT. art. VI, § 2 ('TIhis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."); see
also Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 2-5 (1959) (arguing that the text of the Constitution authorizes judicial
review).
Moreover, the framers undoubtedly intended their judgments concerning
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cial review can be seen either as consistent with the principle of
consent1 8 or as independently legitimate in a system of constitutional government. 19
The Supreme Court's authority is properly questioned,
however, when the Court recognizes constitutional rights not
decreed by the framers, for in these cases the Court lacks its
direct constitutional license to invalidate majoritarian actions. 20
individual rights to constrain majoritarian policy making. This constraint
would be virtually meaningless, however, if the majoritarian branches, governed by majoritarian pressures, were to have the final word in deciding constitutional questions, i.e., in deciding when their constitutents' will could not
be given effect. The Supreme Court is the only institution created by the
framers with sufficient independence to recognize constitutional limitations on
majoritarian action.
In sum, the Supreme Court's enforcement of the framers' intentions is legitimate regardless of whether that legitimacy is grounded on the framers' express language, on their implied intentions, or even on a purely functional
argument. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra, at 3 ("[T]he power . . .is grounded in
the language of the Constitution and is not a mere interpolation."); A. BICKEL,
supra note 9, at 13 ("This is not compelled by the language of the Constitution;
it is implied from desirable ends that are attributed to the entire scheme."); M.
PERRY, supra note 2, at 11-17 (arguing that this practice is legitimate because it
serves crucial functions).
18. The Constitution, of course, was adopted with the consent of a majority. See Berger, Michael Perry's Functional Justificationfor Judicial Activism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 465, 471 n.40 (1983); Dellinger, The Legitimacy of
ConstitutionalChange: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV.
386, 386 (1983) ("That the American system of government traces its authority
to a Constitution originally consented to by conventions elected by (a portion
of) the people is one significant legitimating feature of the regime.") (footnote
omitted); cf Bork, supra note 9, at 3 ("Society consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain enduring principles believed to
be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the Constitution.").
19. A constitutional government, by definition, operates pursuant to and
in accordance with a constitution. It follows that as long as the constitutional
government remains in place, so too should the principles embodied in its organic document. Cf M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 12 ("No one, after all, contends that our commitment to the principle of electorally accountable
policymaking is exclusive. We are committed as well to the principle that
electorally accountable policymaking is constrained by the value judgments
embodied in the constitutional text ....");Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 383-84 (1981) ("The authoritative status of the
written constitution is ... an incontestable first principle for theorizing about
American constitutional law. . . . For the purposes of legal reasoning, the
binding quality of the constitutional text is itself incapable of and not in need
of further demonstration.") (emphasis in original).
20. Although the framers could have given the Supreme Court an openended license to "create" constitutional rights beyond those delimited at the
time of the Constitution's adoption, there is no persuasive evidence that they
did. As Professor, now Judge, Robert H. Bork has observed:
[N]ot even a scintilla of evidence supports the argument that the
framers and the ratifiers of the various amendments intended the ju-
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Thus, the critical issue becomes whether, or to what extent, the
Court can legitimately recognize constitutional rights by reference to norms other than, or in addition to, those adopted by
the framers. No issue of constitutional theory is more
fundamental.21
In elaborating this issue, the conventional language of constitutional theory speaks of "originalist" (or its synonym, "interpretive") and "nonoriginalist" (or "noninterpretive") judicial
review. 22 "Originalist" review can be defined as constitutional
decision making by reference exclusively to norms that the
framers originally embodied in the Constitution.23 Being so defined, originalist review is not controversial.24 Conversely,
when the Supreme Court decides constitutional cases by reference to norms other than or in addition to those supplied by the
framers, its review can be labeled "nonoriginalist." Nonoriginalist review rests on no visible source of authority, and its
exercise is controversial indeed. Thus, in the conventional landiciary to develop new individual rights, which correspondingly create

new disabilities for democratic government. .. .If the framers really
intended to delegate to judges the function of creating new rights by
the method of moral philosophy, one would expect that they would
have said so.
Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 695, 697; see McCree, To Preservean EndangeredSpecies, 52 U.
CIN. L. REv. 986, 987 (1983) ("It appears quite certain that this role that the
Court and the Constitution have come to play in the life of our nation was
neither planned nor foreseen when article III of our basic document was
drafted and ratified."); see also infra note 63; cf.Furman v. Georgia, 408 Us.
238, 467 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[The Supreme Court has not] been
granted a roving commission, either by the Founding Fathers or by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, to strike down laws that are based upon
notions of policy or morality suddenly found unacceptable by a majority of this
Court.").
21. The analysis of any particular constitutional doctrine is incomplete
without a prior resolution of the legitimacy issue, for one cannot fairly test the
Supreme Court's selection of governing norms without first deciding the
source or sources from which those norms can properly be drawn.
22. The "originalist"/"nonoriginalist" terminology was first suggested by
Professor Paul Brest. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 204-05 (1980).
23. Professor Thomas C. Grey has written:
What distinguishes the exponent of the pure interpretive model is his
insistence that the only norms used in constitutional adjudication
must be those inferable from the text-that the Constitution must not
be seen as licensing courts to articulate and apply contemporary
norms not demonstrably expressed or implied by the framers.
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STN. L. REv. 703, 706 n.9
(1975).
24. But see supra note 17.
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guage of constitutional theory, the fundamental issue of legitimacy is whether, or to what extent, the Supreme Court can
25
exercise nonoriginalist review.
For the "originalist," the question of legitimacy has a simple answer, if not an easy one: all nonoriginalist review is illegitimate. The originalist finds the sole authority for judicial
review in the framers' adoption of controlling norms, but that
authority extends only to the invalidation of majoritarian actions that conflict with those norms. In other words, the Constitution, as originally understood, is authority for originalist
25. As I suggest parenthetically in the text, many scholars would substitute "interpretive" for "originalist" and "noninterpretive" for "nonoriginalist."
See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 7, at 1; Grey, supra note 23, at 705. "Originalist"
and "nonoriginalist," however, are much more descriptive of the distinction
they are employed to reflect. See Brest, supra note 22, at 204 n.1; cf. Bennett,
Objectivity in ConstitutionalLaw, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 446 n.3 (1984) (arguing that "'originalism' better captures the static pretense of the approach that
seems to me to be its principal flaw").
Although "noninterpretive" review need not be as extreme as its name
implies, the term might be taken to suggest the total absence of interpretation
and thereby the absolute irrevelance of the constitutional text and the framers' intentions. Indeed, the term might even connote a failed attempt at interpretation. Thus, in the semantics of constitutional theory, any advocate of
"noninterpretivism" starts with a self-imposed linguistic handicap: "noninterpretive" review sounds illegitimate. As Professor William W. Van Alstyne has stated:
It may say too much about the current condition of constitutional
scholarship that "noninterpretivism" is willingly adopted as a mode of
describing one's own work in constitutional law. If there were not
writers who evidently welcome its fit [citing Perry as an example],
one might have supposed that its use was limited and purely perjorative [sic], a mere epithet cast cruelly against a judge or another
writer-a harsh opinion of their work (e.g., that judge so-and-so rendered another "noninterpretation" of the first amendment in his latest opinion).
Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of
Special Theories of JudicialReview, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209, 217 n.27 (1983).
See generally Saphire, Constitutional Theory in Perspective: A Response to
Professor Van Alstyne, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1435, 1443-52 (1984) (discussing Van
Alstyne's criticism of noninterpretive theory).
Perry utilizes the "interpretive"/"noninterpretive" dichotomy in his book.
See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 10-11. In a new article emphasizing the importance (especially the symbolic importance) of the constitutional text, however,
Perry employs the "originalist"/"nonoriginalist" terminology. See Perry, The
Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. - (1985) (forthcoming). (Although Perry's new
essay is part of a symposium, I had prepublication access only to his contribution; as a result, I have not considered the remainder of the symposium in the
preparation of this Article.) See generally Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797 (1982) (discussing the importance of
the language in the constitutional text).
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review. But this grant of authority does not extend to nonoriginalistreview.

The definition of originalist review thus is directly related
to the basis of its legitimacy: the historical adoption of the Constitution and the embodiment in it of specified norms. Accordingly, originalist review permits only a historical analysis to
determine precisely what constitutional rights the framers intended to create.26 The Court's mission is plagued with practical difficulties, for the framers' intentions are not easily
divined.27 These practical difficulties, however, cannot justify a
creative attempt to fill gaps in the framers' stated intentions. If
those stated intentions are incomplete, equivocal, or ambiguous,
the Court cannot recognize a constitutional right because its
existence cannot be determined without reference to norms beyond those provided by the framers. When the Court cannot
determine what the framers have said, it is as if they did not
speak at all. The framers' guidance alone must be sufficient.28
26. The Court can glean the framers' intentions from the actual text of
the Constitution, from the constitutional debates, from extrinsic circumstances
surrounding the enactment, and even from the governmental structures that
the Constitution ordains. As Professor Grey has observed:
The pure interpretive model should not be confused with literalism in constitutional interpretation, particularly with "narrow" or
"crabbed" literalism. The interpretive model, at least in the hands of
its sophisticated exponents, certainly contemplates- that the courts
may look through the sometimes opaque text to the purposes behind
it in determining constitutional norms. Normative inferences may be
drawn from silences and omissions, from structures and relationships,
as well as from explicit commands.
Grey, supra note 23, at 706 n.9 (emphasis in original).
27. Common problems include the determination of whose intentions are
relevant; whether the intentions of some framers are more important than
those of others; whether subjective, as well as objective, intentions can be examined; and whether statements made outside the formal process of constitutional enactment can be considered. See Saphire, JudicialReview in the Name
of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745, 772-78 (1983); qf. Brest, supra
note 22, at 222 (suggesting that "the originalist constitutional historian may be
questing after a chimera"); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 469, 477 (1981) (noting that "there is no such thing as the intention of the
Framers waiting to be discovered, even in principle"). For an intriguing discussion of originalism and the complex nature of historical knowledge, see
Tushnet, supra note 6, at 793-804.
28. Professor Robert N. Clinton has argued that the judiciary has no
choice but to assign meaning to unclear constitutional provisions that have
been invoked in opposition to majoritarian actions:
[J]ust as judicial lawmaking is required when statutory provisions are
ambiguous and the framers' intent is unclear, judicial lawmaking is
required in the constitutional sphere when the Constitution is by its
terms unclear and the intent of the framers is ambiguous. The necessity that the judiciary perform its intended obligation to interpret and
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In contrast to the very narrow role for the Supreme Court
contemplated by originalism, "nonoriginalism" seeks to expand
the Court's authority by defending the Court's use of norms beyond those constitutionalized by the framers. Nonoriginalists
differ on the proper source of these norms, and the nonoriginalist position thus is not monolithic.29 Regardless of what source
is identified, however, the nonoriginalist cannot attribute the
Court's authority to the adoption of the Constitution,3O but
must look elsewhere.
Although the line between originalist and nonoriginalist
review is not a bright one, most of the Supreme Court's modern
constitutional decisions3l must be characterized as nonoriginalist.32 In Brown v. Board of Education,33for example, the Court
found the majoritarian practice of segregated public schooling
to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Segregated
schooling, however, existed at the time of the fourteenth
enforce the limits that the Constitution imposed upon the Congress
and state legislatures imperatively requires it to make law in such
cases if it is to discharge its functions.
Clinton, Judges Must Make Law: A Realistic Appraisal of the Judicial Function in a Democratic Society, 67 IOWA L. REV. 711, 725 (1982).
There is another viable option, however, for a court presented with an ambiguous constitutional provision: simply reject the constitutional challenge.
When faced with unclear legislative intentions in the course of interpreting a
statute, it is true that a court ordinarily must give meaning to the statute as
best it can, for the case must be decided one way or another. When faced with
an unclear constitutionallimitation on government, however, a court can decide the case without making dubious inferences concerning the framers' intentions, for it can instead defer to the majoritarian decision under attack. Cf.
Bork, supra note 9, at 8 ("Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify
the value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed
human value to any other. The judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new rights.").
29. Accordingly, the legitimacy debate is not necessarily an "all-or-nothing game." See infra Part III. But cf. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 92 (arguing
that "in crucial respects, it is an all-or-nothing game") (emphasis in original).
30. See supra note 20; infra note 63.
31. The modern constitutional period is frequently traced to the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 19; Brest, supra note 22, at 234; Kay,
PreconstitutionalRules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 189 n.10 (1981) ("Critics of all
persuasions seem to agree that the Supreme Court has substantially departed
from any reasonable interpretation of the drafters' intentions, at least in important areas of constitutional law."); Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation,
79 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1061 (1981) ("No more than a passing familiarity with
history is required to appreciate that only a very small fraction of contemporary constitutional law corresponds with what can plausibly be considered the
historical 'core meaning' of the Constitution, even on the most generous interpretation of that notion.").
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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amendment's adoption, and it continued thereafter unabated.34
Not surprisingly, the Court in Brown conceded that the original
understanding of the amendment was at best "inconclusive"35
but, relying on other normative considerations,36 it nonetheless
recognized a constitutional right to be free from segregated
schooling. Likewise, the framers' intentions compelled neither
the Court's recognition of a constitutional right to abortion in
Roe v. Wade,37 nor its recognition of numerous other modern
3
constitutional rights. 8

Although originalism plainly does not describe the
Supreme Court's actual role in contemporary American government, it is a comfortable theory. Finding no authority for nonoriginalist review, advocates of originalism rest their case,
challenging others to prove them wrong.3 9 Moreover, playing

34. As Professor Perry has observed, "[T]he legislative history of the fourteenth amendment clearly discloses that the framers did not mean for the
amendment to have any effect on segregated public schooling or on segregation generally." M. PERRY,supra note 2, at 66-67 (footnote omitted).
35. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
36. In its opinion, the Court emphasized the importance of public education and the psychological impact of segregated schooling. See id. at 492-95.
Following the Brown decision, however, the Court soon made it clear that all
public segregation was unconstitutional, undercutting the stated rationale in
Brown and suggesting that a broader moral principle was at work. See, e.g.,
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam), affg mem. 142 F. Supp. 707
(M.D. Ala. 1956) (segregated public buses unconstitutional); Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam), modifying mem. 223 F.2d 93 (5th
Cir. 1955) (segregated public golf courses and parks unconstitutional); Mayor
of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam), affg mem. 220 F.2d
386 (4th Cir. 1955) (segregated public beaches unconstitutional). In Johnson v.
Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam), the Court summarized the governing
constitutional principle: "[A] State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities." Id. at 62.
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Professor, now Dean, John Hart Ely has called
Roe "the clearest example of noninterpretivist 'reasoning' on the part of the
Court in four decades." See J. ELY, supra note 7, at 2; see also Ely, The Wages
of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); cf.
Strong, Bicentennial Benchmark Two Centuries of Evolution of Constitu.
tionalProcesses, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1, 97 (1976) (calling Roe "a classic illustration
of constitutional amendment by judicial say-so").
38. Professor Perry has concluded that "virtually all of [the] constitutional doctrine regarding human rights fashioned by the Supreme Court in
this century" is based upon nonoriginalist review. See M. PERRY, supra note 2,
at 91; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text; cf.Miller, supra note 6. at
696 n.214 ('The Supreme Court has always been 'noninterpretivist'; those who
dislike such activism are making 'should' or 'ought' statements.").
39. See; e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 407 (1977) ("Whence does the Court

derive authority to revise the Constitution? In a government of limited powers it needs always be asked. what is the source of the power claimed?"). As
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on the indisputable principle of majoritarian consent, the
originalist message takes on populist overtones, supporting "the
people" and decrying "judicial usurpation."40
Originalism is such an enticing theory that numerous
scholars seek to join the camp by expanding its boundaries.
These theorists typically redefine originalist review by suggesting that the Court can look beyond the framers' particular
intentions to their broader purposes and goals, thereby rendering many modern Supreme Court decisions "originalist" and
hence legitimate.41 These definitional exercises are futile, for
Professor Grey has noted, originalism is a constitutional theory "of great
power and compelling simplicity." See Grey, supra note 23, at 705.
40. Raoul Berger, for example, has asked:
Why should millions of Americans prefer the "gut" reactions of the
Justices against death penalties, for instance, to their own belief that
death penalties are a deterrent to crime, as current legislation in some
35 states attests? The judicial "gut" reaction, under democratic principles, is no substitute for the will of the people.
... T]he real issue, judicial usurpation, [should be put] out into
the open, so that the people can decide for themselves whether they
prefer to rule their own destiny.
Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 466 (1981) (footnote omitted); see also Ervin, The Constitutional Power of Congress over Federal Courts, 68 A.B.A. J.
1536, 1536 (1982) ("I abhor judicial usurpation and deem tyranny on the bench
as reprehensible as tyranny on the throne."); Marcus, Fight Looms on Court
Jurisdiction,Nat'l L.J., Apr. 6, 1981, at 1, col. 3 (referring to "'the euphemism
called judicial review that has really become judicial tyranny' ") (quoting Representative Robert K. Dornan); cf.M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 28 (noting that
originalism "reflects a popular-'civics book'-understanding of the division of
governmental authority in the American political system").
Of the Supreme Court's current membership, Justice William Rehnquist
is perhaps the most vocal advocate of the originalist position. See Rehnquist,
Observation: The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
For other prominent statements of the originalist position, see R. BERGER,
supra note 39; Bork, supra note 9; Monaghan, supra note 19; Strong, supra
note 37.
41. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 132-37 (1977) (arguing that the focus should be on the framers' general "concepts," not their specific "conceptions"); J. ELY, supra note 7, at 12 (describing his theory as akin
to a "broad form of interpretivism," one that seeks to derive norms "from the
general themes of the entire constitutional document and not from some
source entirely beyond its four corners"); Freund, Storms over the Supreme
Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1474, 1478 (1983) (claiming that the Supreme Court has not
departed from "the connotative meaning, the purposive meaning" of the Constitution); Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 64 (1981) ("Interpretivism cannot be
narrow in scope because this would defeat the framers' purpose of trying to
govern the future through broad, general proscriptions; interpretivism cannot
be narrow precisely because constitutional provisions are rarely narrow or specific in definition."); Leedes, A Critique of Illegitimate Noninterpretivism, 8
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they disregard a critical point: the definitional scope of
originalist review is limited by the source of its legitimacy.
When the framers' intentions are exhausted, so too is the
Court's authority.42 If the framers' intentions are not themselves sufficiently particular for the Court to define a constitutional right, that right cannot be defined without reference to
other norms, norms to which an originalist Court cannot legitimately refer.4
U. DAYTON L. REv. 533, 546 (1983) (stating that an originalist court can properly cite "the framers' first principles as opposed to the pragmatic eighteenth
century applications of their first principles"); Lupu, Constitutional Theory
and the Searchfor the Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 579, 603 (1983)
(contending that originalist review includes not only a consideration of the
framers' intentions concerning specific practices, but also an analysis of the
"more generalized sense of the [constitutional provision's] aim"); Richards,
The Aims of Constitutional Theory, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 723, 742 (1983) (asserting that the originalist focus can extend beyond the "denotation" to the
"connotation or concept" of a constitutional provision); cf. Lynch, supra note
5, at 546 (arguing that the general language in the Constitution should be read
in light of societal changes, regardless of whether "the framers of particular
constitutional provisions consciously intended to leave particular questions of
interpretation for future development by the courts"). Even Professor Bork,
generally a classic originalist, defends first-amendment doctrine beyond that
constitutionalized by the framers. Bork points to the Constitution's general
recognition of democratic principles: "[The framers] indicated a value when
they said that speech in some sense was special and when they wrote a Constitution providing for representative democracy, a form of government that is
meaningless without open and vigorous debate about officials and their policies." Bork, supra note 9, at 26. See generally M PERRY, supra note 2, at 65-66
(noting that Bork's position on the first amendment cannot be justified by reference to the framers' intentions).
Dean Terrance Sandalow's comment is apt: "Now it is true that all the
decisions shaping constitutional law to contemporary values can also be understood as coming within the general intentions of the framers. All that is necessary is to state those intentions at a sufficiently high level of abstraction."
Sandalow, supra note 32, at 1045. See generally Tushnet, supra note 6, at 790'92 (criticizing Dworkin's attempt to expand the originalist position through
definitional enlargement).
42. As Berger has observed:
If ...
judicial review is in fact derived from the text and history of
the Constitution, it must be within the compass envisaged by the
Framers-policing of boundaries and exclusion of policymaking reserved to the legislature. History cannot be invoked to establish the
power, then discarded when seen to limit its scope.
Ra BERGER, supra note 39, at 362.
43. This does not mean that originalism prohibits the invalidation of modern analogues of practices that the framers intended to proscribe. Professor
Perry, for example, asserts his belief that
no theorist has ever argued that the judiciary should invalidate only
political practices that were present to the minds of the framers and
the framers meant to ban. The interpretivist concedes that the judiciary may, even should, strike down political practices that were not
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Consider again the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education and assume, for the sake of argument, that the historical record did not disclose the framers' intention to permit
the continuation of segregated schools,44 but instead was silent
on that issue. 45 Under the expanded originalist theory, the
Court's task in such a case would be to implement the "broad
purpose" behind the fourteenth amendment. Even if the framers' "broad purpose" was to promote racial equality, however,
the Court could not apply that general principle to the particular question before it based on the guidance of the framers.
present to the minds of the framers and that, therefore, the framers
could not have specifically intended to ban. But invalidation of such a
political practice is legitimate, according to interpretivism, only if the
practice is the analogue of a practice the framers did contemplate and
mean to ban, different in no constitutionally significant respect from
the practice the framers specifically intended to ban. After all, enforcing value judgments the framers constitutionalized certainly requires invalidation of practices different in no significant respect from
those the framers banned. Thus, for example, the interpretivist need
not oppose Supreme Court decisions subjecting wiretaps and electronic surveillance to the same fourth amendment standards as physical "searches and seizures."
M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 32-33 (footnotes omitted). Perry finds the identification of analogues to be "fairly straightforward":
A present-day political practice, P, is simply an analogue of a past,
constitutionally banned practice, P, when a person-one who aspires
to logical consistency and moral coherence-who would endorse the
political-moral proposition that P ought to be banned, could point to
no difference between P and P' that could count as a principled reason for failing to endorse the distinct proposition that P' ought to be
banned.
Id at 74.
Perry is correct in principle, for the framers undoubtedly intended to ban
all practices "different in no constitutionally significant respect from the practice[s] the framers specifically intended to ban." See id. at 32 (footnote omitted). He is also correct in practice to the extent that the identification of
modern-day analogues can be logically derived from the framers' intentions
without regard to other normative factors. Thus, Perry's "search and seizure"
example, involving unforeseen technological advances, may be a good one.
Given the basis of its legitimacy, however, originalism cannot defend the invalidation of any supposed "analogue" when its identification depends to any degree upon a norm or value judgment not provided by the framers. Cf.
Tushnet, supra note 6, at 801 n.55 (arguing that the originalist "is unable to
give a content to the idea of functional equivalence sufficiently determinate to
enable us to know which contemporary practices are enough like past ones to
fall under the framers' ban"). See generally Lynch, supra note 5, at 547 (contending that originalism fails "to solve the problems posed by application of
constitutional language to new technologies").
44. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
45. Cf. supra note 35 and accompanying text (despite strong historical evidence that the framers intended to permit the continuation of segregated
schooling, the Brown Court labeled the evidence "inconclusive").
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-Although the modern importance of public education, the psychological effects of segregated schools, and the moral implications of governmental decision making based on race might
well have justified a conclusion that segregated schools hindered racial equality,46 none of these considerations are attributable to the framers. By definition, then, the Court's review in
Brown could not have been originalist; it necessarily involved
normative considerations beyond those embodied in the original
understanding of the fourteenth amendment.
Perhaps originalism is not as comfortable as it seems. One
cannot be a principled originalist and defend the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown. One cannot be a principled originalist and defend the Supreme Court's contemporary first-amendment doctrine.47 Indeed, a principled originalist would have
difficulty supporting any of the constitutional rights recognized
by the Court in its modern history, not because the rights
should not exist, but rather because the Supreme Court should
not be deciding these questions at all.48
II.

MICHAEL PERRY'S THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Michael Perry is not comfortable with originalism. Recognizing the limited bounds of the originalist license, he rejects it
as inadequate. In its stead, he proposes a different sort of license-a nonoriginalist license grounded upon the function that
judicial review serves in American society. Perry's judicial li46.
47.

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
As Professor Perry has noted.

Although we cannot say with certainty precisely what effect the framers of the Bill of Rights intended the first amendment to have with
respect to freedom of expression, we can say that at most they intended it to prohibit any system of prior restraint and to modify the

common law of seditious libel by making truth a defense and by permitting the case to be tried to a jury.
M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 63-64 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
See generally L. LEvY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS IN EARLY AstmERICAN HIsTRy (1960) (describing the narrow interpretation accorded to freedom of expression during America's early history). Moreover, although first-amendment doctrine is now applied more frequently to
state than to federal governmental practices, there is little evidence that the
framers of the fourteenth amendment intended to extend to the states either
the first amendment or any other provision of the Bill of Rights. See . LEVY,
The FourteenthAmendment and the Bill of Rights, in JuDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 64 (1972).

48. See Grey, supra note 23, at 713 (observing that "an extraordinarily
radical purge of established constitutional doctrine would be required if we
candidly and consistently applied the pure interpretive model"); see also supra

notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
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cense would be remarkably broad, and its implications for the
49
American system of government would be extreme.
A.

PERRY'S FUNCTIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF NONORIGINALIST
REVIEW

As a backdrop for his defense of nonoriginalist review in
individual-rights cases,50 Perry sketches his understanding of
the point at which originalism ends and nonoriginalism begins.
Unlike many defenders of a broad judicial role,51 Perry properly eschews a definitional enlargement of the originalist position. Instead, he concedes that originalist review permits
3
reference only to the framers' "plainly narrow"52 intentions,
As a result, Perry cannot defend the Supreme Court's contemporary doctrine concerning individual rights as a product of
originalist review.54
49. Perry's theory is descriptive as well as normative. In particular, Perry
attempts to describe how the Supreme Court in fact exercises nonoriginalist
review in individual-rights cases; in general, his normative theory attempts to
justify and defend that process. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 91-145.
50. Perry also discusses the legitimacy of judicial review in cases involving
federalism and separation-of-powers issues. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 3760.
51. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 71 (emphasis omitted). Perry states that
"power-limiting constitutional provisions-as opposed to power-granting
ones-typically represent and embody . . . discrete, determinative value judgments about what particular sorts of political practices government ought to
forswear." Id.
53. See id. at 10-11; see also id. at 28 (noting that the constitutional norms
of originalism "consist solely of the value judgments constitutionalized by the
framers").
54. As Perry explains:
It is doubtless true that our reading of the original understandings of constitutional provisions such as the free speech and free press
clauses of the first amendment and the equal protection clause is not
perfectly accurate. After all, it is impossible to uncover the intentions
of each of the many framers of a provision-those who drafted the
provision and then those in the state conventions or legislatures who
ratified it. Moreover, historical inquiry is inevitably subjective: to
some extent our vision of the past is irremediably colored-distorted-by our vision in the present. But if not perfectly accurate, our
reading is sufficiently accurate-accurate enough to justify the conclusion that the Court's decisions regarding human rights in most modern constitutional cases of note, and particularly in most freedom of
expression and equal protection cases, cannot plausibly be explained
as "interpretations" or "applications" of any value judgments constitutionalized by the framers, whatever the precise character of those various value judgments might be. They can only be explained as
products of noninterpretive review.
Id. at 69 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 19, 91.
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But Perry wishes to defend the Court's doctrine, or at least
much of it,5 and so he seeks to justify the process by which it is
formulated, the process of nonoriginalist review.SS According
to Perry, such a justification must, as a preliminary matter, permit compliance with the requirement of principled explanation,
as articulated by Professor Herbert Wechsler. Wechsler contends that although courts have a duty to decide the constitutionality of value determinations made by the other branches of
government, they must review those determinations as courts
of law and not as "naked power organs."57 Consequently,
courts cannot overturn majoritarian value judgments unless
they base their decisions entirely on norms that "have force
apart from the particular result they ordain in [any] case at
hand-that is, norms that are both neutral and general."5
A court's "principled explanation" of its constitutional decision, however, does not automatically make the decision a legitimate exercise of judicial review. As Perry notes:
While each and every exercise of judicial review must comply with
the requirement [of principled explanation] in order to be legitimate,
compliance is not sufficient for purposes of legitimacy. The question
whether an explanation invokes only norms deemed by the court to
have force apart from the particular result they ordain is distinct
from the question whether the norm or norms invoked are the proper
ones under all the circumstances. In particular, it is distinct from the
55. Although he concedes as "indisputably true" that the Supreme Court
"is a fallible institution," see id. at 115, Perry believes that the modern Court,
in general, has made sound decisions concerning individual rights, see id. at
117-18. Indeed, Perry asserts that the substantive merit of the Court's freedom-of-expression and equal-protection doctrines is beyond serious question.
See id. at 117. Although he admits that the Court's substantive-due-process decisions are much more controversial, Perry generally defends them as well.
See idi at 118.
56. See generally id. at 4-5 (discussing the relationship between "the legitimacy of a policymaking process" and "the soundness of... particular substantive constitutional doctrines generated by that process") (footnote
omitted).
57. See Wechsler, supra note 17, at 19.
58. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 26. Professor Wechsler elaborates:
[Tihe main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must
be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching. judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved. To be sure, the courts
decide, or should decide, only the case they have before them. But
must they not decide on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but by others that the
principles imply? Is it not the very essence of judicial method to insist upon attending to such other cases, preferably those involving an
opposing interest, in evaluating any principle avowed?
Wechsler, supra note 17, at 15; see also M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 25-27.
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question of whether the source of norms from which the invoked
norms are derived .

adjudication. 59

.

. is an appropriate one for constitutional

The legitimacy of judicial review therefore depends not only on
a court's adherence to the requirement of principled explanation but also, and even more importantly, on the court's use of
a source of "neutral and general" norms that is itself legitimate.
The ultimate test of legitimacy for a source of constitutional norms is whether the use of that source can be reconciled with the principle of majoritarian consent. 60 Perry
accepts the principle of consent as a given, although he refines
it to a "principle of electorally accountable policymaking."01
"In our political culture," writes Perry, "the principle of
electorally accountable policymaking is axiomatic; it is judicial
review, not that principle, that requires justification."62 Perry
thus assumes the task of attempting to justify the Supreme
Court's exercise of nonoriginalist judicial review-its reliance
on norms beyond those the framers embodied in the
Constitution.

Finding no authority for nonoriginalist review in the text
or original understanding of the Constitution,63 Perry concludes
that the practice can be defended only through a functional jus59. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 27 (footnotes omitted).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 6-21.
61. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 9. Perry derives his variation of the
consent principle from our societal commitment to "democracy" in its procedural sense. See id. at 3-4. But "the word democracy is so freighted and misused, suggestive of vague substantive ideals as well as procedural forms," that
Perry prefers the term "electorally accountable policymaking." See id. at 4.
See generally id. at 9-10 (noting the fundamental support for "electorally accountable policymaking" in American culture).
Although the concepts of "majoritarian consent" and "electoral accountability" are closely related (and perhaps indistinguishable in most applications),
I see no theoretical reason to limit the former to the latter.
62. Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted).
63. As Perry notes:
Bear in mind what it means to claim that the framers authorized
noninterpretive review: the claim is necessarily that at some point (or
points) in American history governmental officials delegated to the
judiciary, in particular to the Supreme Court, authority to enforce
against government, not particular value judgments the framers had
deliberated and constitutionalized, but unspecified value judgments
not constitutionalized or even always foreseen by the framers. That
would have been a remarkable delegation for politicians to grant to an
institution like the Supreme Court, given the electorate's long-standing commitment to policymaking-to decisions as to which values
shall prevail, and as to how those values shall be implemented-by
those accountable, unlike the Court, to the electorate ....
Id. at 20. Perry continues:
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tification: "If noninterpretive review serves a crucial governmental function, perhaps even an indispensable one, that no
other practice can realistically be expected to serve--and serves
it in a manner that accommodates the principle of electorally
accountable policymaking-that function constitutes the justification for the practice." 64 Thus Perry maps his intended
course: first, to identify a "crucial" function served by nonoriginalist review, and second, to reconcile such review with the
principle of majoritarian consent.
In identifying the function of nonoriginalist review, Perry
begins by contending that "the American people's understanding of themselves"65 imposes an American obligation to promote moral growth in the world by providing the right answers
to questions concerning individual rights.
The American people still see themselves as a nation standing under
transcendent judgment. They understand... that morality is not arbitrary, that justice cannot be reduced to the sum of the preferences
of the collectivity. They persist in seeing themselves as a beacon to
the world,... especially in regard to human rights ("with liberty
and justice for all").

66

As Perry describes it, the American self-understanding necessarily presupposes the existence of right answers, answers that
ought to prevail irrespective of the majority's will.67
Although right answers exist, according to Perry, they
have yet to be fully discovered and implemented. Hence, the
There is no plausible textual or historical justification for constitutional policymaking by the judiciary-no way to avoid the conclusion that noninterpretive review, whether of state or federal action,
cannot be justified by reference either to the text or to the intentions
of the framers of the Constitution... Those who seek to defend
noninterpretive review--"judicial activism"-do it a disservice when
they resort to implausible textual or, more commonly, historical arguments; nothing is gained but much credibility is lost when the case for
noninterpretive review is built upon such frail and vulnerable reeds.
Id. at 24-25; see also supra note 20. For the most prominent recent effort to
tether a broad form of judicial review to the framers' intentions, see J. ELY,
supra note 7, at 2241. For reasons with which I generally agree, Perry rejects
Ely's historical arguments. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 21-24.
64. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 92-93.
65. Id. at 97. Perry calls this understanding our "religious" selfunderstanding. He does not use the term "religion" in its theistic sense, but
rather in the sense of a "civil" religion. See id.
66. Id. at 98 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). As Perry uses the
term, '"humanrights" is synonymous with "individual rights." See id. at 61.
67. "According to this self-understanding, '[t]he will of the people is not
[itself] the criterion of right and wrong. There is a higher criterion in terms of
which this will can be judged; it is possible that the people may be wrong.'"
Id. at 97 (quoting Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUs 1, 4 (1967))
(brackets indicate Bellal's language); cf. Rostow, The Democratic Character of
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American self-understanding includes a commitment "to bring
our collective (political) practice into ever closer harmony with
our evolving, deepening moral understanding."68 Because of
the moral fallibility of the people's will, this commitment to
"moral evolution"69 requires something that majoritarianism
alone cannot provide. It requires an independent institution to
provide moral leadership by assessing the morality of
majoritarian decisions. It requires, says Perry, a moral
prophet.70
To fulfill the role of moral prophet, an institution must be
JudicialReview, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 210 (1952) ("American life in all Its aspects is an attempt to express and to fulfill a far-reaching moral code.").

Perry considers the possibility of right answers to be a necessary precondition for justifying nonoriginalist review, although he does not attempt a
"metaethical" defense of his belief that right answers do exist. See M. PERRY,
supra note 2, at x, 102-07.
In a different vein, Perry uses the possibility of right answers as an alternative basis for his argument, an alternative he claims to be independent of his
conception of our American self-understanding:
For the reader who suspects that in fact there is no religious aspect of
American self-understanding--or that if there is, I have romanticized
it beyond recognition-I can easily, and will readily, recast my essential claim ...
Whether or not there is a religious aspect of American selfunderstanding, as a society we seem to be open to the possibility that
there are right answers to political-moral problems. But even if evidence were slight that we are open to that possibility, we should be
open to it. .

.

. [This proposition] is altogether adequate for purposes

of [describing the function of noninterpretive review]: Noninterpretive review enables us to keep faith with a possibility to which I think
we are open, and to which in any event we should be open.
Id. at 102 (emphasis in original). Perry's recast argument appears to differ in
but two regards from his primary one. First, America's self-understanding
need not call for global leadership in the field of individual rights but rather
may be limited to a search for right answers within our own geographical and
political borders. Second, even if America has no self-understanding at all
concerning right answers, whether for global or more limited purposes, it
ought to have, and we therefore should seek out right answers regardless of
any popular commitment to do so.
Perry's geographical point surely has no theoretical significance. His second point, however, adds a normative element ("we should be open" to the
possibility of right answers) that tends to protect his argument from empirical
attack. Thus, even if an empirical study somehow could demonstrate the absence of any American self-understanding of the type he posits, Perry's normative argument would remain: we should have a self-understanding of this
type, and we therefore should act as if we do.
68. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 99; see also id. at 101 (claiming that Americans are "committed to struggle incessantly to see beyond, and then to live beyond, the imperfections of whatever happens at the moment to be the
established moral conventions.").
69. Id. at 99.
70. See id. at 98.
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relatively detached from majoritarian influences, allowing it to
search out the higher goals of morality. As Perry notes, executive and legislative officials cannot perform this function.71
These majoritarian officials are primarily concerned with the
desires of a majority of their constituents, the persons on whom
the officials depend for their continued tenure in elective office.72 As a result, when these officials act on important political-moral issues,7 3 they "tend simply to rely on established
moral conventions and to refuse to see in such issues occasions
for moral reevaluation and possible moral growth."74
As a matter of comparative institutional competence, states
Perry, the Supreme Court is better suited to search for the
right answers to political-moral problems.75 The Court has a
significant measure of political independence, and its decisions
are not subject to impulsive popular repudiation. Because of its
political insulation, the Court, through the exercise of nonoriginalist judicial review, can regularly perform the essential
role of moral prophet.76 Thus, nonoriginalist review "is an enterprise designed to enable the American polity to live out its
commitment to an ever-deepening moral understanding and to
political practices that harmonize with that understanding."7"
Accordingly, Perry concludes that the Supreme Court's exercise of nonoriginalist review serves the crucial function of discovering the right answers to individual-rights questions,
thereby promoting moral growth.78 A conclusion that the
Court can properly rely on norms beyond those constitutionalized by the framers, however, is incomplete. The source of
norms that will prevail over majoritarian decisions must also be
identified. To identify the source of governing norms is to particularize the process of nonoriginalist review, thereby permitting a meaningful analysis of its legitimacy.
Perry clearly identifies the source of norms to which he believes the Supreme Court does and should refer in the exercise
71. See id at 100.
72. See id.
73. Perry lists some of the more controversial recent issues of this type:
"distributive justice and the role of government, freedom of political dissent,
racism and sexism, the death penalty, human sexuality." Id.
74.

Id.; cf. G. WILL, STATEcRAFr As SouLCRAM

WHAT GovER'wE-r

DOES 159 (1983) (contending that "a government obsessed with responsiveness
is incapable of leadership").
75. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 100-01, 102.
76. See id. at 101.
77. Id78. See generally supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
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of nonoriginalist review. 79 Advancing an admittedly "radical"80
theory, Perry asserts that the governing norms must come from
an internal source-the justices themselves:
The problem of how to proceed, when dealing with a difficult human
rights issue, is not different for the justice than it is for the legislator.
As Cardozo wrote: "If you ask me how [the judge] is to know when
one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get
his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study
and reflection; in brief, from life itself." And the justice, like the legislator, will inevitably conclude that some particular political-moral
principles (perhaps even a particular political-moral system) are better than others. Inevitably each justice will deal with human rights
problems in terms of the particular political-moral criteria that are, In
that justice's view, authoritative. I do not see how it could possibly be
otherwise. 8 '

Thus, Perry concludes that "the ultimate source of decisional
norms is the judge's own values (albeit, values ideally arrived at
through, and tested in the crucible of, a very deliberate search
8
for right answers)." 2
79.

For Perry, the source of values to which the Court should refer is also

the source to which, in his view, it does refer. See generally supra note 49.
80. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 123.
81. Id. at 111 (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRO.
CESS 113 (1921)). Justice Cardozo, of course, was not discussing the role of a
judge in deciding constitutional challenges to legislative decisions that had already determined which competing interests should prevail. See B. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921) ("[The judge] legislates only
between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law."); see also infra text accompanying notes 116-27.
82. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 123; see also id. at 111 n.* (suggesting
that "judges do, and should, make a personal selection among competing values on the basis of individual conscience") (quoting Gibbons, Keynote Address,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 260, 274 (1981)).
Perry makes two significant subpoints concerning the quest for right answers. First, he suggests that although there may be no single authoritative
moral system, right answers often reflect a philosophical and religious consensus, "a point at which a variety of philosophical and religious systems of moral
thought and belief converge." See id. at 109 (emphasis in original); see also id.
at 109-10. Second, he contends that when the American people eventually
come to accept the Court's recognition of a constitutional right, this
majoritarian acceptance tends to suggest that the Court's decision was morally
correct. According to Perry, the Court's constitutional decision making creates
a dialectical relationship between the Court and the majoritarian process; the
majority may revise its original beliefs after being rebuffed by the Supreme
Court and after reflecting on the values that the Court has upheld. See id. at
111-15.
Although a convergence of moral thought or an after-the-fact popular approval might suggest the right answers to moral questions, Perry's Supreme
Court would not be guided by either of these possible criteria of decision.
Rather than search for the point at which a variety of belief systems converge,
the justices are to consult "what they personally regard to be the most rele-
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In Perry's view, the justices should not conceal this internalized process of nonoriginalist review from the American
people. Rather, they should candidly admit to testing
majoritarian actions against their own moral beliefs and should
not pretend that the governing norms originate in some external source.8 3 Thus, although "no harm" would result from the
justices stating that a governmental action "violates the Constitution," they should make it clear that the value judgments are
their own:84
There is no excuse, so far as I can see, for trying to deny to the mem-

bers of the American polity, and to their governmental representatives, the opportunity of deciding for themselves whether
noninterpretive review is legitimate. If they are to make that decision, they must not be deceived as to the nature of the sort of judicial
review the Court exercises. 85

Perry believes that the American people would accept his version of nonoriginalist review. 86 In any event, he believes that
it and
they must have the ultimate power to accept or reject
8
that their decision should be based on fact, not fiction. 7
In the final step of his analysis, Perry attempts to reconcile

his conception of nonoriginalist review with the principle of
vant and fruitful moral thought." Id. at 110-11 (emphasis added). Likewise,
Perry does not expect the judiciary to predict what moral values might gain
popular acceptance in the wake of judicial action. Rather, the Court is to seek
out answers that are "morally correct independently of what a majority of the
American people comes to believe in the future." Id. at 115 (emphasis in original). Perry thus returns to his basic position: "Mhe determinative norms are
the value judgments of the individual justices." rd. at 119.
Professor Richard B. Saphire disagrees with this characterization of
Perry's theory.
[N]otwithstanding Perry's assertion that the judge must derive the
norms that are to be applied to evaluate government action from her
own values (or her own moral vision), I do not read him to claim that
the judge should rely upon her purely idiosyncratic moral conceptios....

At least where she can discern the difference between

her own moral preferences and those emanating from the point at
which extant systems of moral thought converge, she must decide according to the latter.
Saphire, supra note 3, at 793. Saphire himself questions the validity of his alternative interpretation of Perry. See id. at 793 n.48. From my reading of
Perry, I cannot see how he could have been more forthright in rejecting the
view attributed to him by Saphire. Perhaps Saphire's effort to reconstitute
Perry's theory reflects an uneasiness with its implications. See infra Part
H.B.1.
83. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 139-43.
84. See id. at 143 n.*. But cf. M. Perry, supra note 25 (discussing the importance, especially the symbolic importance, of the constitutional text).
85. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 140.
86. See id. at 141-43.
87. See id. at 140.
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majoritarian consent. Perry rejects several means of political
control, such as judicial appointments and constitutional
amendments, as grossly inadequate to counteract the Supreme
Court's enormous power of nonoriginalist review.8 8 In attempting to fashion a more realistic majoritarian control on the
Court's power, Perry asserts that Congress must be permitted
plenary power under the article III exceptions clause89 to limit
Supreme Court and other federal court jurisdiction to decide
nonoriginalist issues of constitutional law.90 Thus, under
Perry's theory, Congress could reverse the effect of any decision not based on originalist review 9 ' by abolishing federalcourt jurisdiction in cases raising that type of constitutional
challenge.92 Congress, for example, could effectively overrule
Roe v. Wade 93 by "denying to the lower federal courts and to
the Supreme Court jurisdiction over any case in which a state
law restricting access to abortion is challenged on constitutional
grounds."94 Perry is "not happy conceding such a broad jurisdiction-limiting power to Congress,"95 but he sees it as the essential link to the principle of majoritarian consent, a link
88. Perry finds the process of judicial appointment to be an ineffectual
control both because of the slow turnover of Supreme Court justices and the
difficulty of predicting how any individual will perform as a justice. See id. at
127; see also J. ELY, supra note 7, at 47. Moreover, he asserts that the process
of constitutional amendment, although potentially effective in overturning unpopular constitutional decisions, is not a majoritariancontrol at all because it
calls for "supermajorities" in support of both proposal and ratification. See M.
PERRY, supra note 2, at 127. Perry also rejects the efficacy of congressional
budgetary and impeachment powers. See id. at 128.
89. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("[T]he Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make."). To be precise, the exceptions
clause relates only to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Congressional
power over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, however, is no less extensive than its power over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,
whatever that power might be. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (Congress has the
power, but not the duty, to create lower federal courts).
90. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 128-39.
91. Perry would not permit the congressional power over jurisdiction to
be used "as a means of preventing the federal judiciary from enforcing value
judgments constitutionalized by the framers." See id. at 130. But cf. inkfra
note 247.
92. Perry maintains that the power to eliminate jurisdiction is theoretically distinct from a power to enact direct legislative reversals of particular
Supreme Court decisions. See id. at 135-37. He seems to concede, however,
that the distinction is tenuous. See id. at 137; see also infra note 150.
93. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
94. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 145.
95. See id. at 137.
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without which nonoriginalist review becomes indefensible.96

B. A CRITIQUE OF PERRY'S THEORY
Perry's argument in support of the legitimacy of nonoriginalist judicial review can be reduced to three basic propositions. First, nonoriginalist review serves a crucial function
by furthering a search for answers that are morally right, not
just politically popular. Second, in fulfilling this function, the
individual justices of the Supreme Court should decide constitutional cases by reference to their own moral values. Third,
this process of nonoriginalist review is not inconsistent with the
principle of majoritarian consent because Congress can control
such review by controlling the Court's jurisdiction. It is primarily with Perry's second and third propositions that I take
issue.
1.

Justices' Personal Values as Controlling

Perry concedes that his theory is "radical" in declaring that
"the ultimate source of decisional norms is the judge's own values."97 Perry's position not only is radical, but is fundamentally at odds with the two conditions that he himself sets forth
as essential for establishing a legitimate theory of judicial review. In particular, Perry's theory of nonoriginalist review fails
to identify a source of norms that is itself legitimate, and the
theory also is inconsistent with the requirement of "principled
explanation."98
The legitimacy of any source of norms can be evaluated at
different levels. At one level, the source of norms can be tested
directly against the basic principle of majoritarian consent. If
the majority, in one way or another, has consented to the
Supreme Court's use of a set of norms for constitutional adjudication, then that set of norms is legitimate. The use of norms
provided by the framers, for example, can be defended in this
manner. 99 Under this analysis, the legitimacy of a source of
norms itself determines the legitimacy of the form of judicial
review that invokes those norms; when the source of norms is
"legitimate" in this sense, the process of review necessarily is
consistent with the principle of majoritarian consent. If the
96. See id. at 137-38. But cf. infra note 244 (discussing a new Perry essay
suggesting that the jurisdiction-limiting power is not essential).
97. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 123.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
99. See supra note 18.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:587

majority has consented to constitutional decision making by
reference to certain norms, it has consented to that type of judicial review and the overriding question of legitimacy has been
answered.
Perry, however, does not and could not contend that his
version of nonoriginalist review is legitimate simply by virtue
of the source of norms that he identifies as controlling. Constitutional decision making by reference to the justices' individual
moral values, standing alone, obviously could not command
majoritarian support. Absent other majoritarian controls, no
significant portion of the American populace would knowingly
support or acquiesce in having majoritarian decisions invalidated when they conflict with the particular moral beliefs,
however thoughtfully derived, of a majority of nine unelected
judges. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a less democratic governmental process.100
Perry's theory of judicial review thus cannot depend on
majoritarian consent to the source of norms that he identifies
as controlling.101 Even if a source of norms is not legitimate in
the ultimate sense of having majoritarian support, however, it
100. See Lupu, supra note 41, at 599 ("Perry's version of the Court's role is
. . . maximally vulnerable to the charge of elitism of the worst sort.").
Although some observers share Perry's belief that the justices impose
their personal values in the name of the Constitution, these persons are the
Supreme Court's harshest critics. Columnist William F. Buckley, for example,
calls the Court's exercise of judicial review "the constitutional objectification
of the Supreme Court's desires and velleities":
It works as follows: We, the Supreme Court, believe in one-man
one-vote, therefore the Constitution does. We, the Supreme Court,
believe that prayer ought not be conducted in the public schools,
therefore the Constitution does. For men who are sworn to uphold
the Constitution to vote without any references to their own evaluation of the historical meaning of the Constitution is nothing less than
an abandonment of duty.
This phenomenon (the Constitution is whatever the Supreme
Court says it is) transcends the question whether you favor or do not
[the particular rights that the Court has recognized].
Buckley, Court Aborting Constitution, Herald-Telephone (Bloomington, Ind.),
July 7, 1983, at 10, col. 3; see also Ervin, supra note 40, at 1536 ("[A]ctivist
Supreme Court justices [should] stop substituting their personal notions for
constitutional precepts, while pretending to interpret the Constitution.").
If the Supreme Court in fact were guided only by the moral beliefs of its
members, Buckley's critical views undoubtedly would hold sway. At least in
the absence of other majoritarian controls, there can be no genuine doubt that
the American populace has not and would not consent to having "five Justices
. . . [substitute their] individual subjective moral values for those of the legislature." Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3022 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
see infra note 222 and accompanying text.
101. As a result, Perry must otherwise reconcile his theory with the princi-
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nonetheless can be logically and functionally appropriate
within an overall theory of review. In other words, the legitimacy of a source of norms can be considered without direct reference to the principle of majoritarian consent, but rather by
evaluating the source of norms itself and the implications of
that source for the constitutional theory of which it is a part.
In testing Perry's theory, this level of analysis asks whether the
justices' use of their personal moral values as controlling norms
is consistent with Perry's functional justification for nonoriginalist review.
According to Perry, nonoriginalist review serves a crucial
function by propelling the American polity toward an ultimate
realization of the morally right answers to questions concerning
individual rights. Although the Supreme Court may not always
10 2
it
provide the correct answer when it first considers an issue,
is expected generally "to move us in the direction of a right answer."03 Indeed, the search for right answers could not be furthered unless nonoriginalist review tended to eventually
provide answers that were morally correct. Consequently,
Perry's theory cannot succeed unless there is some reason to
believe that most of the Supreme Court's answers will be morally sound.104 More specifically, there must be some reason to
believe that the source of constitutional norms posited by
Perry-the justices' individual moral values-is likely to provide moral truth.
Perry grounds the Supreme Court's role as an agent of
moral prophecy entirely on a claim of "comparative institutional competence." 0 5 According to Perry, executive and legislative officials cannot be expected to reach the right answers to
moral questions because they feel compelled to reach answers
pie of majoritarian consent. For my analysis of his attempted reconciliation.

see infra Part II.B.2.
102. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 115; cf. id at 111-15 (contending that
the Court's constitutional decision making gives rise to a dialectical relationship between the Court and the majoritarian process).

103. Id at 102.
104. Perry believes that the modern Supreme Court's constitutional doctrine concerning individual rights is generally sound. See id. at 117-18; supra

note 55. Even if Perry is right, however, this conclusion, standing alone, does
not support his functional justification for judicial review. For Perry's justification to succeed, the moral soundness of the Court's decisions must be more
than coincidence; it must depend on, or at least be consistent with, the process
of decision making that Perry describes.
105. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 102; supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
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that are politically acceptable.106 The fact that the majoritarian
branches are not likely to reach morally correct answers, however, does not mean that the Supreme Court is likely to do so.
The Court's political insulation merely removes one constraint
on uninhibited moral analysis, the constraint of direct political
accountability. Although the absence of that constraint may be
necessary for an institution to reach thoughtful moral decisions,
it is hardly sufficient to justify a claim that the institution's de07
cisions "therefore" will be morally correct.
Perry utterly fails to explain why his Supreme Court, relying on the personal moral values of its members, would be
likely to provide answers that are morally correct. Under
Perry's constitutional model, the Supreme Court would act not
as a court but as a special sort of legislative body. Thus, says
Perry, quoting Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, each justice would
gain "'knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience
and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself.'"108 Given
their political insulation, the justices would not be constrained-as are ordinary legislators-to follow the majority's
will. Instead, they would be free to enforce their own will,
their own political-moral beliefs. Political-moral beliefs, however, depend on numerous psychological and sociological factors
deriving from such things as a person's parental background,
religion, education, occupational history, social relationships,
and indeed, all of a person's life experiences. 0 9 Perry's theory
necessarily implies a claim that morally correct answers would
emerge from decisions reflecting the individual beliefs of five
or more Supreme Court justices, decisions that inevitably
would depend on the particular personal characteristics that
each justice had brought to the Court.11o Such a claim surely
See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 102.
107. As Professor Gerard E. Lynch has observed, "Disinterestedness alone
does not determine success in intellectual endeavor .... " Lynch, supra note
106.

5, at 550. See generally Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction
to a Strategy for ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 425-32 (1984)
(criticizing the institutional arguments made by Professor Perry, as well as the
similar arguments advanced by Dean Harry H. Wellington).
108. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 111 (quoting B. CARDOZO, supra note 81, at
113).
109. Cf. B. CARDOZO, supra note 81, at 12 ("All their lives, forces which
[judges] do not recognize and cannot name, have been tugging at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions ....
").
110. Perry suggests that "there are practical limits to what a judge should
say is constitutionally required or forbidden, his own values notwithstanding."
See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 123 (emphasis in original). He notes that "if
there is an occasional member of the federal judiciary whose moral views are,
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cannot be supported.111 Accordingly, the source of norms identified by Perry-the justices' personal moral values-is inconsistent with his functional justification for nonoriginalist review
because there is no reason to believe that such review would
serve the purpose that Perry suggests." 2 Even in this limited
sense, therefore, the posited source of norms is not legitimate.
Perry's theory thus fails the first essential prerequisite for
establishing a valid theory of judicial review, that the theory
identify a legitimate source of norms. For similar but distinct
reasons, his theory also fails the second. In particular, his proposal that the justices use their individual moral beliefs as a
source of governing norms is inconsistent with the need for
principled explanation.
As Perry recognizes, the basic requirement of principled
explanation demands that all decisions be grounded on norms
that "have force apart from the particular result they ordain in
the case at hand-that is, norms that are both neutral and general."11 3 If the requirement entailed no more than this, Perry's
theory would permit judicial compliance; Supreme Court justices could draw general moral principles from their individual
value schemes and apply those principles with a "neutrality
transcend[ing] any immediate result."114

The requirement of principled explanation, however, has
broader implications. It derives from the more fundamental
proposition that courts adjudicating constitutional cases must
render judicial decisions, not legislative ones. Thus, writes Proby most conventional measures, eccentric, even outrageous.... [there] is no
reason to believe that such an individual will not be constrained by his or her
peers." See id at 124. The problem with Perry's theory, however, is not the
remote possibility that judges might give constitutional effect to eccentric personal beliefs. Instead, the problem is that they would be expected to give such
effect to personal beliefs that, although not eccentric, we have no reason to respect as morally sound.
111. See generally Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The
Role of the Intent of the Framersin ConstitutionalTheory, 63 B.U.L. REV.811,
839 (1983) (suggesting that the qualifications of Supreme Court justices do not
indicate "any particular ability to divine the correct answers to moral
questions").
112. Cf.Richards, supra note 41, at 743 ("Prophetic conscience, in Perry's
sense, is radically indeterminate in a much more objectionable way than any
he criticizes.").
113. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 26; see also supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
114. See Wechsler, supra note 17, at 19; cf.Richards, supra note 41, at 732
(noting that the bald requirement of neutral-and-general decision making
could be satisfied by "consistent superstition").
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lessor Wechsler, courts "are bound to function otherwise than
as a naked power organ; they participate as courts of law."115
Just as the judicial function demands the use of norms that are
neutral and general, so too does it require a source of norms
that is external, a source of norms other than the internal, personal beliefs of the individual justices.
In The Nature of the Judicial Process,116 Justice Cardozo
identified the requirement of principled explanation nearly
forty years before Professor Wechsler's oft-cited article.117
"One of the most fundamental social interests is that law shall
be uniform and impartial. There must be nothing in its action
that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness."118 Cardozo, however, went beyond this basic conclusion that judicial rulings must be neutral and general.
Although, as Perry suggests, Cardozo recognized similarities between the judicial and legislative models,119 he also noted critical differences:
While the legislator is not hampered by any limitations in the appreciation of a general situation, which he regulates in a manner altogether abstract, the judge, who decides in view of particular cases,
and with reference to problems absolutely concrete, ought, in adherence to the spirit of our modern organization, and in order to escape
the dangers of arbitrary action, to disengage himself, so far as possible, of every influence that is personal or that comes from the particular situation which is presented to him, and base his judicial decision
120
on elements of an objective nature.

Cardozo thus suggests that the use of an external source of decisional norms serves to negate personal biases, thereby tending
to ensure neutral-and-general judicial decisions.
More important than this insurance against arbitrary decision making, however, the very nature of the judicial institution compels the use of an external source of norms. Judges,
after all, are judges. They are lawyers, trained in legal reasoning-reasoning perhaps from statute, perhaps from precedent,
perhaps from custom or tradition, but always reasoning from
something. By reasoning from an external source of norms, a
judge renders decisions that can be tested and criticized at each
115.
116.
117.
article
marily
118.
119.
120.

Wechsler, supra note 17, at 19.
See supra note 81.
Cardozo's book was published in 1921, see supra note 81; Wechsler's
in 1959, see supra note 17. Cardozo's book, of course, was devoted prito common-law decision making. See supra note 81.
B. CARDOZO, supra note 81, at 112.
See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 111; supra text accompanying note 81.
B. CARDOZO, supra note 81, at 120-21.
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stage of the analytical process.' 2 1 In particular, critics can intelligently question and challenge whether any given source in
fact provides the norm that the judge finds controlling. Were
judges to derive norms from within themselves, however, only
the judges' personal values could be criticized. Their legal analysis would be unassailable; no one could contend that the
judges' personal values did not include whatever norms they
might invoke.122
The objectivity of legal reasoning separates the judge from
the legislator. This detachment from personal sentiment commands unqualified respect and defines the judicial office. As
Justice Cardozo stated, "the task of the judge [is] the task of a
translator, the reading of signs and symbols given from without." 2 3 Under Perry's model of internal judicial decision mak121. Professor Mark V. Tushnet has argued that the requirement of principled explanation does not provide any meaningful constraint on judicial decision making, in that the "consistent" development and application of
constitutional doctrine can be readily manipulated through differing definitions of the governing "neutral principles." See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 81021; cf.Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism,42 OHIO ST. LJ.
411, 424 (1981) (stating that he, Tushnet, would decide constitutional cases by
making "explicitly political" judgments favoring socialism and then would
write opinions "in some currently favored version of Grand Theory"). I believe that Tushnet grossly underestimates the intellectual integrity of judges
and the ability of legal scholars to evaluate constitutional decision making.
Of course it is true, as Tushnet suggests, that any constitutional doctrine
can be criticized or defended for logical consistency and that the proper resolution of such arguments will depend upon which aspects of which precedents
should be found controlling. Some arguments, however, are better than
others. Compare, for example, Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly
Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae,
32 STAN. L. REv. 1113 (1980) (arguing that the abortion funding cases were
wrongly decided in light of existing Supreme Court precedent) with Tushnet,
supra note 6, at 811-14 (disputing Perry's argument). Far from negating the
importance of the requirement of principled explanation, the susceptibility of
judicial decisions to analytical criticism and defense itself forms a vital part of
that requirement. See generally infra notes 147 & 183.
122. Cf.J. ELY, supra note 7, at 44 (noting that a theory that judges should
impose their personal values in constitutional cases "is not a theory of adjudication at all, in that it does not tell us which values should be imposed") (emphasis in original); O'Fallon, Skepticism and Politicsin the Domain of Rights,
8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 713, 718 (1983) (explaining that under Perry's theory,
"[t]he practice of giving reasons is not to be jettisoned, though the sense in
which they are reasons-can be understood to function as reasons-would
seem to have been fatally compromised") (emphasis in original).
123. B. CARDOZO, supra note 81, at 174. Professor Owen M. Fiss has
written:
[Judges'] capacity to make a special contribution to our social life derives not from any personal traits or knowledge, but from the definition of the office in which they find themselves and through which
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would

risk

"degenerating into . . .a jurisprudence of mere sentiment or
feeling. A judicial judgment . . . 'should be a judgment of ob-

jective right, and no subjective and free opinion; a verdict and
not a mere personal fiat.' "124
To be sure, judges cannot completely detach their judicial
selves from their personal beliefs and desires. "We may try to
see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can
never see them with any eyes except our own."125 Objectivity,
however, is and must be the judicial goal. Although personal
beliefs will color their vision, judges must search for rules of
law beyond themselves.126 They are judges. They are not
"knight[s]-errant roaming at will in pursuit of [their own ideals]
of beauty or of goodness."127
they exercise power. That office is structured by both ideological and
institutional factors that enable and perhaps even force the judge to
be objective-not to express his preferences or personal beliefs, or
those of the citizenry, as to what is right or just, but constantly to
strive for the true meaning of the constitutional value.
Fiss, Foreward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1979) (footnote omitted). See generally Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L.
REV. 739 (1982) (disputing the view that constitutional interpretation cannot
be objective).
124. See B. CARDOZO, supra note 81, at 106-07 (footnotes omitted).
125. Id. at 13. In an elaboration of his position, Justice Cardozo stated:
The training of the judge, if coupled with what is styled the judicial
temperament, will help in some degree to emancipate him from the
suggestive power of individual dislikes and prepossessions. It will
help to broaden the group to which his subconscious loyalties are due.
Never will these loyalties be utterly extinguished while human nature is what it is.
Id. at 176.
126. As Judge Learned Hand has written:
No doubt it is inevitable, however circumscribed his duty may be, that
the personal proclivities of an interpreter will to some extent interject
themselves into the meaning he imputes to a text, but in very much
the greater part of a judge's duties he is charged with freeing himself
as far as he can from all personal preferences, and that becomes difficult in proportion as these are strong.
L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 71 (1958).
127. B. CARDOZO, supra note 81, at 141. For an important and useful essay
distinguishing judicial objectivity from constitutional authoritativeness, see
Bennett, supra note 25.
Perry's thinking concerning the nature of nonoriginalist judicial review
appears to be undergoing something of a transformation. In a new essay, he
links nonoriginalist review to the American political tradition and its aspirations and, if I read him correctly, he may be retreating from the proposition
that Supreme Court justices should use their personal values in an open-ended
search for moral truth. See Perry, supra note 25.
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Reliance on Exceptions Clause

The ultimate validity of any theory of judicial review depends on reconciling such review with the principle of
majoritarian consent. Perry does not contend that his version
of nonoriginalist review satisfies the consent principle by virtue
of the source of norms that he identifies as controlling, the personal moral values of the justices.ns Likewise, he does not suggest that the posited function of nonoriginalist reviewfurthering a search for morally correct answers-is sufficient to
justify the practice, because Perry's functional justification has
no direct relation to the requirement of consent; even a functionally useful governmental practice should not prevail in a
democratic society unless it receives majoritarian support. 9
Thus, nothing inherent in Perry's functional model of nonoriginalist review reconciles such review with the principle of
consent. Indeed, Perry's model exacerbates the problem. All
judicial review, even originalist review, presumptively conflicts
with the requirement of consent, for the Supreme Court's recognition of any constitutional right substitutes the decision of
an unelected court for that of elected officials. The conflict is
much more pronounced, however, when the Court exercises
nonoriginalist review. Nonoriginalist review cannot be defended by reference to the actions of the elected officials who
adopted the Constitution; 30 at the same time, it expands the
Court's judicial role by enlarging the source of norms that can
be used to invalidate majoritarian decisions. The broader the
scope of judicial review, the greater the countermajoritarian
dangers.
Perry's model of judicial review would grant to the
Supreme Court a virtually unlimited power to articulate constitutional rights, deciding for itself the boundaries of its authority. Confined only by their collective good judgment, the
justices would be free not only to move beyond the realm of
originalist review, but to engage in an open-ended search for
moral truth by looking within themselves for answers that are
128. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
129. One could read Perry's functional argument simply as providing reasons why the majority ought to accept nonoriginalist review, if and when it is

given a chance. Cf. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 140 n.* ("I think noninterpretive review is legitimate and would be accepted by the polity as such .... ").
130. See supra notes 20 & 63; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text
(originalistreview can be defended in this manner, thereby tending to mitigate its countermajoritarian nature).
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morally right.131 Perry apparently recognizes that his model
poses extraordinary countermajoritarian dangers, tilting the
scales heavily against the majoritarian process:
The tension between noninterpretive review and the principle of
electorally accountable policymaking seems especially acute in light of
the fact that the decisional norms the Court elaborates and enforces
in the exercise of such review are derived not from some authoritative
source of value, external to the Court, 132
to which "the people" subscribe, but from the justices' own values.

Given the expansive judicial model that Perry creates, he can
satisfy the consent requirement only by creating an equally expansive majoritarian counterbalance. Perry, in a sense, has
painted himself into a corner.
Having drawn such an awesome power of nonoriginalist review, Perry understandably rejects as inadequate a number of
traditional majoritarian controls on the Supreme Court and its
decisions.13 3 Instead, he attempts to reconcile his model with
the principle of majoritarian consent by relying on article III's
exceptions clause.134 In particular, Perry would concede to
Congress a plenary power to limit-or even eliminate-the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to decide nonoriginalist35 constitutional issues. Thus, by a simple majority vote in each House
coupled with presidential approval, Congress could adopt jurisdiction-limiting legislation, thereby effectively overruling nonoriginalist decisions by depriving the Court of jurisdiction "to
decide future, similar cases in the same way."136
Perry contends that congressional resort to the exceptions
clause would not "'demoralize and upset the judicial process.' "137 He notes that Congress has "not relied on a jurisdiction-limiting proposal in over a hundred years as a way of
dealing with an unpopular Supreme Court decision."138 Con131. Cf. Rabkin, supra note 5, at 145 (describing Perry's model as "breathtakingly open-ended").
132. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 125.
133. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. But cf. infra note 244.
134. See supra note 89.
135. See supra note 91.
136. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 131 (emphasis omitted).
137. See id. at 132 (quoting McCleskey, JudicialReview in a Democracy: A
DissentingOpinion, 3 Hous. L. REV. 354, 364 (1966)).

138. See id at 133. This failure to enact jurisdiction-limiting legislation has
occurred despite the introduction and consideration of numerous legislative
proposals. For partial listings of recent proposals, see Clinton, A Mandatory
View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 744 n.4 (1984); Rossum, Congress, The Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court:
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gressional doubts-unfounded doubts, if Perry is correct--concerning the lawful scope of the exceptions clause may partially
explain this congressional inaction.139 According to Perry, however, "[a] deeper reason for Congress's reticence about jurisdiction-limiting proposals ...
has been the fact that many
members of Congress approve of the Court's policymaking with
respect to human rights, even those aspects of its policymaking
that have borne the brunt of widespread criticism, though their
approval is often strategically covert."140 Consequently, suggests Perry, members of Congress may be ignoring their constituents' wishes by using the Supreme Court as a scapegoat.
"One can begin to understand why many members of Congress
may have a vested interest in turning a deaf ear to jurisdictionlimiting proposals, even to the extent of acting as if there are
serious doubts as to the extent of its jurisdiction-limiting
power."-11 Perry therefore does not fear the exceptions clause
because he does not believe Congress is likely to use it.142
Perry's reliance on a theory of covert congressional support
for the Supreme Court's decisions, however, ignores a much
more likely explanation for Congress's failure to adopt jurisdiction-limiting legislation. Even if members of Congress perceive
that the exceptions clause gives them the power to overturn
Supreme Court decisions, they may nonetheless believe that it
would be improper to exercise that power, whether or not they
disagree with any particulardecision. Most members of Congress, like their constituents, believe that the Supreme Court
has a special role in deciding constitutional cases, such that the
Court's decisions concerning individual rights ought not to be
disturbed by the majoritarian process. They respect the
Supreme Court as a court of law, a court that they perceive to
make principled constitutional decisions through traditional
legal reasoning and analysis.143 To be sure, most members of
The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions Cause, 24 WhL & MARY L. REv.
385, 386 n.4 (1983); Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term-Foreword" Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of
the FederalCourts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17, 18 n.3 (1981).
139. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 134.
140. Id; cf. 104 CONG. REc. 3198 (1958) (statement of Sen. Talmadge)
(claiming that some in Congress, "for political considerations, choose to wink
at the Court's flagrant usurpations").
141. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 134 (emphasis in original).
142. See id. at 132.
143. Cf. Attanasio, Everyman's ConstitutionalLaw: A Theory of the Power
of JudicialReview, 72 GEo. L.J. 1665, 1696-1716 (1984) (arguing that Congress
has refrained from exercising its jurisdiction-limiting power due to a funda-
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Congress must recognize that the Court engages in nonoriginalist review by referring to norms beyond those supplied by the
framers.144 The Court can engage in such review without losing congressional respect, however, as long as the norms to
which it refers derive from sources perceived as appropriate for
constitutional decision making.145
Perry's judicial model, however, differs markedly from the
traditional one that Congress and the American public have
come to accept. Under Perry's theory, the Court would not act
as a court of law, testing majoritarian decisions against an external source of norms, but rather would substitute the justices'
personal "right answers" for the "wrong answers" reached by a
majority. If the Court has ever engaged in that sort of constitutional decision making, it has never revealed it to Congress and
the American people.146 If Perry's theory were to prevail, however, the justices would be required to "disclose" what Perry
feels they should be doing and in fact have been doing all
along-recognizing constitutional rights based on their own notions of morality.147 Moreover, if Perry is correct, there is no
mental psychological need in the American people for moral certitude, a need
the Supreme Court fills through its constitutional rulings).
144. See infra text accompanying notes 186-243.
145. See infra Part III.
146. See generally M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 139-41. But cf. supra note 100
(some critics of the Supreme Court believe that the Court simply substitutes

its will for that of the majority).
147. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 139-40. As Perry observes, there is no
excuse for an attempt by the Supreme Court to conceal the manner in which
it exercises judicial review. See id. at 140; supra text accompanying notes 8387. Professor Saphire, however, takes issue with Perry on the question of judicial candor:
[E]ven if I were to accept Perry's conclusion that the Court has been
engaged in pure policymaking, I would still be cautious in suggesting
that it should (at least precipitously) be candid in announcing [that
fact]. Although there is much to recommend candor. . . it is not necessarily the exclusive, nor always the most important, political or
moral value.
Saphire, supra note 3, at 797 n.65 (citation omitted). If Saphire is suggesting
that the Court should be permitted to deceive the people "for their own good,"
his suggestion is remarkably elitist. If he is suggesting something else, he
needs to amplify his position.
Note that judicial candor does not necessarily require that a court's written opinion, containing the legal justification for its decision, include an explanation of the extralegal factors that may have influenced its result. See N.
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 16 (1978) ("[W]hat
prompts a judge to think of one side rather than the other as a winner is quite
a different matter from the question whether there are on consideration good
justifying reasons in favour of that rather than the other side."); cf. Leedes,
supra note 41, at 543 ("What the judge had for breakfast may prompt him to
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impediment to the congressional adoption of jurisdiction-limiting legislation to countermand nonoriginalist Supreme Court
decisions, and Congress and the public ought to recognize the
existence of this power. If, in such an environment, the
Supreme Court, with unblushing candor, were to attempt to replace the majority's answer to a moral question with the justices' own, Congress doubtless would countermand the Court's
decision. Even if one were to attribute past congressional inaction to covert congressional support for the Court's unpopular decisions, that support would quickly disappear in the light
of constituent knowledge that the justices were overriding
majoritarian values with their own and that Congress had the
unquestionable power to overturn the Court's actions. 148
It simply is impossible to believe that Perry's constitutional
model would operate in the manner that he would hope. Perry
would demean the Supreme Court's function in constitutional
cases by eliminating the Court's role as a court of law and substituting a role of unelected moral legislature. As a result, the
Court could create whatever "constitutional" rights it desired,
but the Court's decisions would warrant little public respect.
Perry's solution to the problem of majoritarian consent, the
congressional power over jurisdiction, would unquestionably be
effective, so effective that it would destroy the Court's power to
render unpopular nonoriginalist decisions.149 Perry-style judirule in favor of Smith, but his breakfast is an extralegal irrelevancy.") (footnote omitted). What candor does require is that a court be intellectually honest in its legal analysis. For example, if a judge cannot honestly say that a
constitutional decision can be derived exclusively from the intentions of the
framers, the judge ought not to make such a claim.
Perry apparently believes that the Supreme Court's nonoriginalist decisions cannot honestly be grounded on anything short of an invocation of the
justices' personal moral values and that candor therefore compels the Court to
disclose this method of analysis. Moreover, because Perry views this process
of decision as legitimate and defensible, he sees no reason for the Court to attempt to justify its decisions in any other terms.
148. Cf.Rabkin, supra note 5, at 147 ("Writing well after the 1980 elections, [Perry shows no] great concern about the possibility of a destructive popular backlash against the excesses of judicial activism.").
149. Professor James M. O'Fallon has discussed the effect of Perry's position concerning the congressional power over jurisdiction:
The important thing to note about submission of jurisdiction to
legislative control is what it does to the sense of "right" involved in
innominate rights review. No longer could rights be thought of as
something we have independent of majority will. There might be collateral consequences, depending on the way control over jurisdiction
was exercised, which would stand in the way of making the jurisdictional question a straightforward referendum on the right. But the
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cial review, coupled with the legislative oversight that he contemplates, would relegate constitutional doctrine to no greater
stature than statutory interpretation or common-law decision
making-indeed, less, for the Court's recognition of constitutional rights necessarily would run counter to preexisting
majoritarian policies.150
Perry favors an expansive role for the Supreme Court, a
"fierce" judicial activism.' 5 ' Ironically, the implications of his
theory point unmistakably to an evisceration of the Court's important function in American government. In attempting to
fan the fire of morality, Perry would unintentionally douse the
flame.
fact is that it would leave us only those rights that no determined majority could be mustered to oppose.
O'Fallon, supra note 122, at 720.
150. In refusing to concede to Congress an outright power to reverse the
Court's nonoriginalist decisions (as theoretically distinct from a power to eliminate the Court's jurisdiction), Perry suggests how such a power of reversal
would adversely affect the Supreme Court's governmental role:
Were Congress to be conceded the power to reverse, we would come
to view the Court, in its noninterpretive role, as a sort of delegate of
Congress, much as a court in its common-law role is a delegate of the
legislature, which may revise the common law. Such a change In the
relationship between Congress and the Court would tend to undermine the very inter-institutional tension-the dialectical interplay between Court and Congress-that is the reason to value
noninterpretive review in the first place. The moral authority of the
Court's voice would be diminished; its opinions would be essentially
only advisory.
M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 135-36.
Why would legislative control over jurisdiction not have the same effect?
Perry's answer is not persuasive: "[T]here is a difference between reversing
the Court on a particular issue, and merely silencing the Court. The power to
silence (the jurisdiction-limiting power) has never been thought to reduce the
Court to Congress's delegate." Id at 136 (emphasis in original). And why not?
If, for example, Congress were to eliminate the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
(and that of the lower federal courts) to hear any case challenging the constitutionality of a state law restricting access to abortion, such a jurisdictional
statute would have virtually the same effect as a legislative determination that
Roe v. Wade and its progeny had been wrongly decided. See id. at 130-31.
If there is any difference between legislative "reversal" and legislative "silencing," it appears to be purely symbolic. In any event, whatever difference
may exist is surely insignificant in terms of the potential effect on the institutional relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court. Given the exceedingly broad power of judicial review that Perry contemplates, his fear of a
legislative power of reversal is well grounded. But he should be equally fearful of the congressional power over jurisdiction, which could operate just as
effectively to undercut the delicate relationship between the legislative and judicial branches.
151. See id. at 138.
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III. BEYOND PERRY'S THEORY: THE LEGITIMATE
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS CASES
Although I reject Perry's expansive model of nonoriginalist
review, I do not reject all of his thoughtful insights on the possible function of such review. To reject nonoriginalism would
be to reject wholesale the Supreme Court's contemporary constitutional doctrine concerning individual rights.152 It would
mean that judicial review could serve no function beyond that
permitted by originalism, that is, beyond the testing of
majoritarian actions against the particular intentions of a group
of historical actors-the constitutional framers.153 As Perry
teaches, however, our society vitally needs to search for the
right answers to questions concerning individual rights. Indeed,
as our majoritarian government grows, the need to protect individual rights becomes ever more essential. The Supreme Court
has the necessary political independence to redress
majoritarian decisions that undermine individual rights and if,
through the practice of nonoriginalist review, the Supreme
Court somehow can identify rights that morality requires us to
recognize, thepractice should not be lightly cast aside.
To advocate nonoriginalist review is to propose the use of
constitutional norms beyond those provided by the framers. It
is not to suggest, however, that all possible sources of norms
are acceptable, nor that the proper scope of nonoriginalist review is boundless. Nonoriginalist review is not monolithic, and
neither is the issue of its legitimacy.154 To the extent that the
permissible nonoriginalist sources or the permissible occasions
for their use are limited, the exercise of nonoriginalist review
itself is constrained. Through the identification of such constraints, one may be able to isolate a species of nonoriginalist
review much more defensible than the one suggested by Perry.
In the remainder of this Article, I attempt to isolate and
defend such a species of judicial review, one that goes well beyond originalism but that falls far short of the broad judicial
role that Perry describes. In so doing, I identify the source of
nonoriginalist norms to which I believe the Court can properly
refer, and I outline the criteria that the Court should consider
in deciding when to use that source in the exercise of nonoriginalist review. Unlike Perry's expansive model of judicial
152. See supra text accompanying notes 31-48.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 22-28.
154. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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review, the model suggested here is one that I believe the
American people and their elected representatives have come
to accept as useful and appropriate. Accordingly, this model,
unlike Perry's, can operate in relative harmony with the principle of majoritarian consent without inviting Congress to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the Court's
constitutional decisions should be legislatively countermanded
under the exceptions clause.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT AS A COURT OF LAW: THE ROLE OF
THE JUDICIARY IN DEFINING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

In determining the proper scope of judicial review, two basic propositions must be recognized at the outset. First, as
Perry suggests, there is a critical need to achieve better answers to individual-rights questions than the answers provided
by the majoritarian process alone; judicial review should address this need to the fullest extent possible. Second, the
Supreme Court is not and cannot be a "bevy of Platonic Guardians."155 It is rather a court of law, a court composed of judges
with a special, but limited, role. To disregard the second proposition is to undercut the first, for the American polity understandably would reject any effort by the Court to make moral
judgments outside the Court's appropriate judicial function.
The requirement that the scope of review be shaped by the
Court's judicial function suggests certain limitations. As discussed earlier, the Court's decisional norms must originate in a
source external to the Court and its members.156 In addition,
the Court's use of such an external source must be circumscribed by the justices' competence-their ability to determine
what norms the source contains and to articulate rules of law
consistent with those norms.
Both of these limitations flow from the nature and special
strength of the judicial process. Unlike legislative actions, judicial decisions are not grounded directly on popular consent.
Instead, they owe their stature to the process by which they are
rendered, a process not based on log-rolling or political compromise but rather on reasoned discourse. In rendering its decisions, a court responds to legal arguments and makes legal
arguments of its own. It invokes rules of law-legal normsfrom sources outside the judge's personal beliefs, sources that
155.
156.

L. HAND, supra note 126, at 73.
See supra text accompanying notes 113-27.
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can be independently analyzed by legal critics. This process of
legal reasoning tends to ensure not only a "principled explanation" for the court's decision but also an overriding judicial objectivity, neutrality, and fairness. Moreover, even in the use of
an external source of norms, a court must act within the limits
of its competence. Otherwise, its decisions would warrant no
respect, being supported neither by direct popular consent nor
by any expectation of a sound result.
These limits on the judicial function might suggest to some
that the Supreme Court is institutionally incapable of addressing America's need to pursue moral truth. Clearly, the Court
cannot, as Perry maintains, directly search for answers that are
"morally right" in an absolute sense-answers that transcend
the multifarious systems of political, moral, and religious
thought and that resolve moral controversies for which those
various systems provide divergent solutions. There simply is no
recognized external source from which the Court, through a
process of legal reasoning, could derive answers of this type. 5 7
Nonetheless, I contend that judicial review, in a less direct
way, can forestall moral retardation and promote moral
growth. In particular, I believe that judicial review, consistent
with the limited nature of the judicial office, can operate to
keep America on its own path of moral development, as evidenced by our history and traditions, our contemporary national values, and the emerging trends of American morality.
This suggested source of constitutional norms, an external
source to which the Supreme Court can properly refer, tends to
157. Although he opts instead for an internal source of decisional norms,
Perry does suggest an external source that might tend to reflect "morally
right" answers. In particular, he suggests that the correctness of a given answer may be evidenced, "in part at least, by its location at a point of convergence among a variety of moral systems." See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 110;
see also supra note 82. If this "point of convergence" represents a point at
which the moral systems of most Americans converge, then Perry's observation may have merit, although I would prefer to think of the point as a point
on the evolving pattern of American morality that I discuss in the text. If,
on
the other hand, Perry is referring to moral systems not commonly accepted in
America, then the Supreme Court would appear to lack the competence to derive norms from such a source of decision or even to determine which moral
systems ought to be canvassed in searching for a point of convergence. See infra text accompanying notes 181-83. But cf. Richards, Moral Philosophy and

the Search for Fundamental Values in ConstitutionalLaw, 42 OHio ST. LJ.
319, 324-30 (1981) (arguing that judges can benefit from moral philosophy even
when conflicting moral theories support divergent substantive results). In any
event, the American people would surely reject the Court's reliance on moral
systems not prevalent among Americans. See generally infra Part l.B.
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reflect what the American nation has regarded and is coming
to regard as morally sound. For the Court to test majoritarian
decisions against norms derived from this source is for it to further moral growth, but only in the sense of keeping the American polity on its own developing course of moral thought. As
such, judicial review cannot directly seek out "morally right"
answers, but it can attempt to keep America "on track" and
perhaps even propel it forward toward its ultimate moral
destination.158
Given the countermajoritarian nature of nonoriginalist review, however, it must serve a critical function in order to warrant a theoretical defense. Thus, one might question the
validity of a theory that calls for the Supreme Court merely to
enforce some recognized pattern of American moral development and not to search directly for moral truth. But recall
Perry's discussion of moral evolution.159 Perry contends that
the American polity is, and always has been, engaged in a process of moral growth, a process reflecting an ever-deepening
understanding of moral issues and their proper resolution.
Perry's principle of moral evolution thus would suggest that
our moral conventions are, and always have been, in a process
of gradual change, change for the better, change moving us ever
closer to answers that are morally right (in the absolute sense).
If so, then there may be a pattern of American moral development that would itself suggest answers morally superior to
those of any temporary majority.
At least as to individual rights, the evidence appears to confirm that America is on a course of moral evolution, a course of
moral growth. In our treatment of black Americans, for example, we have moved from the institution of slavery to a rather
broad recognition that racial discrimination should not be tolerated. In a similar fashion, we are coming to regard most forms
of sex discrimination as impermissible, this in a society where
women were long denied even the right to vote. Likewise, we
158.

Professor Alexander M. Bickel noted:

The function of the Justices ... is to immerse themselves in the tra-

dition of our society and of kindred societies that have gone before, in
history and in the sediment of history which is law, and, as Judge
Hand once suggested, in the thought and the vision of the philosophers and the poets. The Justices will then be fit to extract "fundamental presuppositions" from their deepest selves, but in fact from
the evolving morality of our tradition.
A. BICKEL, supra note 9, at 236 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 267 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
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have begun to recognize greater rights for the handicapped, the
institutionalized, and the poor. Few would contend that we
have not at least been making "progress" concerning individual
rights, that is, morally positive changes for the better.160 Regardless of whether we can ever reach the level of ultimate
moral truth, or even know precisely what it is, our society appears to be moving (perhaps very slowly) toward such a
destination.
America, however, does not always push forward on its
general course of positive moral development. "Significant accomplishments in building a just society have alternated with
corruption and despair in America, as in other lands, because
the struggle to institutionalize humane values is endless on this
earth."163 Although the nation's long-term pattern may reveal
a course of moral growth, temporary majorities representing
temporary opinions can cause the country to deviate from this
course or can slow progress to a halt.162 Accordingly, the longterm pattern of American moral development is likely to suggest answers that are morally superior to those of any transient
majority.
This pattern of American moral development thus represents an external source of nonoriginalist norms to which the
Supreme Court can and should refer when deciding questions
concerning individual rights. Through the use of this source,
the Court can advance the country's moral development by rejecting the inconsistent actions of temporary majorities. In this
fashion, the Supreme Court can further, albeit indirectly, the
search for morally right answers.
When deciding an individual-rights issue, of course, the
Supreme Court cannot rely on the pattern of American moral
160. As Professor Robert N. Bellah has note&
[S]imultaneous with widespread evidence of corruption has been continuous pressure for higher standards of moral behavior. Eighteenthcentury Americans with a few notable exceptions tolerated slavery,
we do not. Nineteenth-century Americans tolerated violence and discrimination against immigrants and ethnic minorities; we do not. The
early 20th century tolerated the notion that women were basically inferior to men, even while giving them the right to vote; we do not. In

the treatment of blacks, ethnic minorities, and women we still have
far to go, but it would be hard to argue that we were better in these
respects at any earlier period in our history.
R. BELLAH, supra note 6, at xi-xii.
161. Ic- at 2.
162. As Professor Wellington has observed, "[C]ommunities, like individuals, may well violate principles to which they usually adhere." Wellington,
supra note 9, at 514 n.133.
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development unless it can identify the pattern with respect to
that issue. 163 To locate this pattern, the Court can examine factors such as constitutional and statutory enactments (and failures to enact), societal customs and practices, and public
opinion. When evidence of this type reveals a dominant American position on the issue at any given point in time, that position represents a point on the pattern of American moral
development. Through the mapping of such points, the pattern
itself can be derived.164
The more developed the pattern of American morality, the
greater the confidence with which the Court can act. The
Court therefore is least likely to err when the moral principle
it upholds has already grown to reflect the contemporary national morality. In such an exercise of nonoriginalist review,
the Court draws its decisional norms from this contemporary
morality and invalidates as unconstitutional any inconsistent
governmental practice. 165
163. As to certain moral issues, such as racial discrimination, the basic pattern now seems unmistakable. As to others, it may be incomplete and
uncertain.
164. Even if a pattern of morality can be identified, it is of little use in determining the course of moral evolution unless it is a pattern of development,
i.e., changing morality. If the pattern is flat and unchanging, it might reflect
moral stagnation or perhaps even moral truth, but it cannot reflect moral
growth. The principle of moral evolution tells us only that a historical pattern
of changing moral beliefs is likely to reflect positive moral growth.
Note that the pattern of American moral development, in a sense, is
majoritarian in character. It has been established by the American people and
their elected representatives. And yet it transcends the ordinary majoritarian
process by tracing the American morality, a majoritarian morality, as it has developed and is developing over the course of our national history.
165. In his early writings, Professor Perry argued that the Supreme Court
can properly rely on contemporary societal values in deciding constitutional issues. See, e.g., Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: 7Te
Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Perry, Ethical Function]; Perry, The Abortion Funding
Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66
GEO. L.J. 1191 (1978). Professor Wellington has expressed a similar position.
See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973); Wellington, supra note
9; cf. Leedes, Reasonable Expectations and the Concept of Due Process of Law,
35 U. FLA. L. REV. 254 (1983) (urging society's "reasonable expectations" as a
standard for defining substantive-due-process rights).
Professor Ira C. Lupu has written that the search for unenumerated constitutional values should be "for values deeply embedded in the society, values
treasured by both past and present, values behind which the society and its
legal system have unmistakably thrown their weight." See Lupu, Untangling
the Strands of the FourteenthAmendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1040 (1979)
(emphasis omitted). Lupu argues that there must be a historical as well as a
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Majoritarian governmental practices, of course, ordinarily
reflect the contemporary American morality, but this is not invariably so. For example, a state or federal practice may suffer
from legislative166 inattention and thus fall behind the advancing moral pattern. Alternatively, in any given state, even a policy that has received recent majoritarian reaffirmation might
nonetheless conflict with what has become the American morality, for the American morality is national in its geographic
scope; one state's moral development might lag behind.
Many Supreme Court decisions protecting procedural
rights, including the rights of the criminally accused, can be understood as exercises of nonoriginalist review upholding contemporary values in the face of legislative inattention.
Legislatures concentrate primarily on substantive rights and
obligations, not the method by which those rights and obligations are to be enforced. Indeed, procedural challenges frequently attack administrative practices, such as police practices,
that have been created and maintained without any direct legislative involvement at all. Moreover, even if the legislature, at
one time or another, has turned its attention to a procedural issue, it is unlikely to monitor its resolution of that issue for continued adherence to contemporary values. Most procedural
matters are perceived to be "technical" in character and not of
significant public-policy concern. As a result, legislators generally do not attend to the protection of procedural rights, at least
not on a regular basis. It therefore should not be surprising
that judicial review has played a dominant role in shaping such
rights, rights that the majoritarian process itself might have
recognized had it seen fit to consider the matters at stake.167
Nor is the problem of legislative inattention limited to the
realm of procedure. Legislatures often neglect to repeal subcontemporary commitment to any value before the Supreme Court can prop-

erly grant that value constitutional stature. See id. at 1040-41; see also Developments in the Law-The Constitutionand the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156,
1177-87 (1980) (suggesting that unenumerated constitutional rights must be

firmly rooted in tradition and worthy of continued recognition). Although I
share Lupu's concern for judicial caution in the identification of constitutional
norms, see infra text accompanying note 273, his theory, in calling for a backward-looking consistency in societal values, is dramatically at odds with the
Supreme Court's role in furthering the cause of American moral growth, see
supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
166. What I say of legislative officials applies as well to elected executive
officials at any level of government.
167. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 526-81 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing procedural due process).
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stantive statutes that no longer reflect society's changing morality. The judicial invalidation of these statutes likewise can
be explained as an application of contemporary moral values.168
If the legislature recently has turned its attention to a
question of individual rights, however, one could argue that the
legislature's resolution of that issue necessarily determines the
contemporary American morality. If so, then no exercise of
nonoriginalist review with respect to that issue could be understood as being based merely upon the enforcement of contemporary moral values. To the contrary, however, I believe that
many nonoriginalist decisions-in particular, decisions in which
the Court has invalidated state (as opposed to federal) practices-can indeed be so understood, even though the legislature
may have recently addressed the issue in question.
When the United States Congress has reached a recent
conclusion concerning an issue of individual rights, its decision
168. Constitutional decision making in institutional reform cases, for example, can be readily explained in this fashion. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at
152 (observing that the intolerable conditions in "many prisons and mental
health facilities are not part of some institutional master plan, ratified by a
legislature," but rather "are in significant measure the consequence of legislative and bureaucratic inertia and, of course, of budgetary priorities") (footnotes omitted); see also Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities,75 Micu.
L. REV. 1162, 1187 (1977) (noting that many constitutional challenges are directed to administrative practices, not legislative policies). As Professor Perry
wrote in an early article:
Mindful that legislatures by and large reflect conventional attitudes, it might seem at first blush that morals legislation will always
serve the public morals, that the legislature will make criminal only
nonobtrusive human behavior which the moral culture believes
should be criminal. This, however, is not always the case. A law may
remain on the books for so long that it no longer reflects contemporary moral culture. The anti-contraception statute struck down in
Griswold was of this kind.
Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 165, at 727; cf. Freund, supra note 41, at
1480 (suggesting that "[t]he recent Court, by and large, has set aside old laws,
laws having to do with segregation, illegitimacy and abortion that may or may
not represent a contemporary consensus and that may represent political stasis
and abnegation").
On a different level, the problem of legislative inattention may justify, at
least to some extent, increased judicial scrutiny of laws that adversely affect
groups who have been consistent losers in the political process on a wide variety of matters. In considering such a law, there is less-than-usual reason to
believe that the legislative process has included a careful consideration of the
moral issues at stake, for the arguments of the disadvantaged group, if past
history is any guide, might well have been ignored. See generally United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that a
more searching judicial inquiry may be appropriate when reviewing statutes
that disadvantage "discrete and insular minorities" who cannot protect themselves through the ordinary political process).
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ordinarily must be taken to reflect the contemporary national
morality.169 By contrast, the legislative decisions of a state (or
some political subdivision) may reflect only a local morality and
not the national morality at all. For example, one state's harsh
punishment for a particular crime may deviate sharply from
the treatment of that crime prevailing in other states, that is,
deviate sharply from the prevailing national standard.1o With
the transportation and communications revolution that we have
witnessed in this century, ours has become a shrinking nation
and indeed a shrinking planet. As a result, our political community has grown to become predominantly national in charac169. A recent congressional enactment typically is the best available evidence of the nation's contemporary moral standards. But there may be other
indicia as well, such as recent action by a number of state legislatures, contemporary societal customs and practices, and public opinion itself. These other
indicia might occasionally be strong enough to overcome the evidence of the
contemporary national morality that is provided by recent federal legislation.
Cf. Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 165, at 727 ("[A] piece of legislation
might have been put on the books only because a sufficiently interested minority has lobbied---and perhaps bartered-for it."). See generally Is Congressfor
Sale?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 28, 1984, at 47, 47 (critics charge that
influence peddling in exchange for campaign contributions "smacks of 'Congress on the auction block' "). At least when the legislative record reveals a
careful and thoughtful consideration of the moral issues at stake, however, the
Supreme Court should generally defer to any recent congressional enactment.

Cf C.

BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW

41 (1981) ("As to issues of na-

tional consensus, the presumption has to be that Congress is the empowered
voice.") (emphasis in original); Sandalow, supra note 168, at 1181-90 (arguing
for judicial deference to congressional and other broadly based political decisions, when deliberately made, as authoritative statements of contemporary
constitutional values). See generally Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64
(1981) ("Whenever called upon to judge the constitutionality of an Act of Congress ... the Court accords 'great weight to the decisions of Congress.'..
The customary deference accorded the judgments of Congress is certainly appropriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered the question of the
Act's constitutionality.") (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US.
448, 552 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I would hold this statute unconstitutional . .. because it simply raises too many serious questions that Congress
failed to answer or even to address in a responsible way.").
The Supreme Court's pattern of decision suggests that the Court does tend
to respect contemporary congressional judgments concerning national moral
values. Interpreting data compiled by Robert Dahl, for example, Professor
Tushnet (making a point quite different from mine) has concluded that with
respect to federal legislation, "in most cases the Court [has] invalidated statutes enacted years before, where support by contemporary political majorities
was questionable." See Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and
Prophecy,8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 809, 812 (1983); see also Dahl, Decision.Making
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,6 J. PUB. L
279 (1957).
170. See infra notes 213-23 and accompanying text.
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ter. The need for both intranational fairness and international
leadership has led the American morality to demand consistent
national standards for the protection of individual rights, standards beneath which no state or locality can be permitted to
fall.171 Thus, when the Supreme Court exercises nonoriginalist
review with respect to state and local practices, many of its decisions can be understood as applications of those national stan72
dards to wayward governmental practices.1
A significant portion of the modern Supreme Court's constitutional decisions therefore can be explained as exercises of
nonoriginalist review drawing decisional norms from America's
contemporary morality. These are among the Court's less controversial nonoriginalist decisions, however, for the Court, in
effect, is upholding dominant national values; the
"majoritarian" practices it invalidates are either ones that have
suffered from legislative inattention or that represent only a
minority opinion in the national political community. Through
this type of nonoriginalist review, the Court acts to bring lagging governmental practices in line with the advance of contemporary moral thought. ,
The Court faces its most difficult decisions when it considers governmental practices that are consistent with the contemporary national morality but that may conflict with the
emerging pattern of American morality. In terms of constitutional theory, the question becomes whether the court can test
the validity of governmental practices by reference to standards
of morality that are likely to prevail in the future. For the
171.

Cf. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

75 (1969) ("In policing the actions of the states for their conformity to federal
constitutional guarantees, the Court represents the whole nation, and therefore the whole nation's interest in seeing those guarantees prevail, in their
spirit and in their entirety."). But cf. Maltz, Federalism and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Comment on DEMOCRACY AND

DISTRUST,

42 OHIO ST. L.J. 209,

221 (1981) ("[L]ocal autonomy is a key concept in the American system, and
* . . finding a value to be constitutionally protected
erodes this concept by
forcing national standards on both the political and judicial branches of state
governments.").
172. Indeed, the difference between national and local majoritarian policy
making may well explain why the vast majority of cases in which the Supreme
Court invalidates governmental practices involve state or local practices, not
federal ones. Cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983) (upholding constitutional validity of Nebraska legislature's use of a publicly paid chaplain, in
part because of consistent congressional adherence to a similar practice). But
cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973) (adopting local standards for
defining obscenity under first-amendment doctrine). See generally infra note
201.
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Court to undertake such a task would require it, in effect, to
predict the course of moral progress.
Prediction is a hazardous business, and especially so in the
context of morality.173 But as the Supreme Court's risk of error increases, so too does the potential benefit from its decision.
For the Court to recognize individual rights in accordance with
emerging moral principles is for it to do more than uphold the
advancing pattern of American morality; it is for it to accelerate the advance-to push America forward in its search for
moral truth.174

If any one case exemplifies both the risk and the potential
gain of such a moral prediction, it is Brown v. Board of Education.175 The contemporary morality of 1954, as evidenced by
widespread governmental practices, continued to support segregated schooling, although the movement for racial equality was
growing.7 6 In retrospect, one can see the Court's decision as
propelling this movement forward to the point that there exists
today a general consensus supporting the basic result in
7

Brown.1 7

Other constitutional decisions also can be cited as evidence
of the Supreme Court's attempt to predict moral development.
In its 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,178 for example, the Court
recognized a constitutional right to obtain an abortion free from
most governmental restraints. Whether the Court in Roe correctly identified the emerging morality concerning abortion remains to be seen, although it appears that a majority of
Americans now joins the Court in supporting at least a limited
right to abortion.79 Likewise, the Court's consideration of the
173. See J. ELY, supra note 7, at 69-70.
174. Cf. A. BIcKEL, supra note 9, at 239 ("[T]he Court should declare as law
only such principles as will-in time, but in a rather immediate foreseeable fu-

ture-gain general assent."). See generally A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 90 (1970) ("The Supreme Court's judgements may
be put forth as universally prescriptive; but they actually become so only when
they gain widespread assent... [T]he Court's judgements need the assent
and the cooperation first of the political institutions, and ultimately of the
people.").
175. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
176. See generally supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
177. This explanation of Brown implies that, even absent the Court's decision, the American morality eventually would have come to demand an end to
official segregation. In the exclusive hands of majoritarian officials, however,
the eradication of de jure segregation might have taken decades longer.
178. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
179. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 145. See generally Perry, Ethical Function, supra note 165, at 735-36 ("In retrospect, it seems that the Court, in de-
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death penalty can be interpreted as a (halting) attempt to identify the trend of moral thinking on this issue.'8 0
The pattern of American moral development, as revealed
by the past, the present, and the emerging future of the American people, is an external source of constitutional norms that
keeps faith with the Supreme Court's judicial office. The judicial role, however, requires not only that the Court's source
of decision be external. It requires as well that the source be
one with which the Court has competence to work: the Court
must have the ability to identify the governing decisional
norms by deriving them from their source with some assurance
8 1
of accuracy.I
In the abstract, a source of norms may appear to be ideally
suited for use in constitutional adjudication. In other words,
the source may house norms that properly ought to be used in
testing majoritarian decisions concerning individual rights. A
source of norms is useless, however, unless the Court can determine what norms the source provides and how those norms
should be implemented as principles of constitutional law. If
the pattern of American moral development is, in theory, an
appropriate source of decisional norms, it can be useful in constitutional adjudication only to the extent that the Court can
identify the governing norms with some degree of confidence
and apply those norms through the process of judicial decision
making.18 2

ciding Roe as it did, struck down laws that were contrary to the evolving,
maturing conventions of the moral culture. No doubt these evolving conventions would eventually have generated a radical reform of the abortion laws
invalidated in Roe.").
180. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982); see also infra notes 220-21, 223, 225-26, and accompanying text.
181. An inquiry into judicial competence frequently centers on the training
and experience of judges, and these factors are indeed important. The ultimate criterion of competence, however, is whether judges can identify and apply the correct rules of law (in light of whatever standards of "correctness"
might be appropriate). To the extent that the correct rules of law are readily
discoverable, for example, judges may be competent without regard to their
training or experience. As a result, judicial competence varies not only with
judicial training and experience but also with the source of decision, the source
of governing norms.
182. Perry contends that our pluralistic society holds values so diffuse and
fragmented that national moral values simply cannot be isolated for use in
constitutional adjudication. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 93-97. For the reasons discussed in the text, I disagree.
To be sure, problems of judicial competence do exist under the model that
I have drawn, for the selection of norms from the pattern of American moral
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As discussed earlier, the Court's ability to identify the pattern of American morality varies with the point on that pattern
to which the Court directs its attention. The Court has a
greater competence to determine contemporary moral values
than it does to divine emerging moral principles that have not
yet gained national acceptance. The Court's competence also
may vary with the subject matter under consideration. For example, the training and experience of a judge might provide
greater expertise concerning procedural, as opposed to substantive, issues. As a result, the judge might have greater competence in determining the pattern of moral development
concerning such issues and might be better able to formulate
rules of law consistent with that pattern.
In the final analysis, the proper scope of nonoriginalist review depends on its utility in furthering America's progress on
its path of moral development. This utility, in turn, depends on
two interrelated factors. First, the utility is greater when the
Court's recognition of a constitutional right would tend to accelerate, and not merely uphold, the pattern of American
moral growth. Thus, when the Court looks beyond the present
to emerging moral principles, its constitutional decisions hold
the highest potential for gain. Second, the utility of nonoriginalist review varies with the Supreme Court's competence
to derive and articulate constitutional rights consistent with the
evolving pattern of American morality. The Court's competence varies by subject matter and also with the degree to
which the pattern of American morality has developed. As to
any given subject, the Court's competence varies inversely with
the potential utility of its decision. Accordingly, when the
Court looks beyond the contemporary morality to the future
course of moral progress, the potential utility of its decision increases, but so too does the risk of error. Only when the potential gain outweighs the risk ought the Court to undertake such
a venture.le3
development does not approach an exact science. It is no less exact, however,

than attempts to decide constitutional cases by reference to the framers' "general intentions" (here I include Dean Ely's model, see supra J. ELY, note 7) or
through some method of moral philosophy. Moreover, the constitutional theories that arguably tend to avoid these problems of competence, such as pure
originalism or Perry-style nonoriginalism (the justices obviously can identify
their own values, see supra text accompanying note 122), raise other sorts of
problems that are ultimately much more troublesome. See generally supra
Parts I & H.B.
183. In describing the proper role of the Supreme Court in defining constitutional rights, I have focused primarily on the creation of new constitutional
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THE SUPREME COURT AS AN OBJECT OF RESPECT:
MAJORITARIAN CONSENT TO THE PROCESS OF
NONORIGINALIST REVIEW

Under the model of nonoriginalist review I have proposed,
the Supreme Court, within limits, can serve a vital function by
furthering the cause of American moral development and
thereby (indirectly) furthering the search for morally right answers. Nevertheless, utility alone is insufficient to demonstrate
the propriety of this model for a democratic society. The principle of majoritarian consent still must be addressed.184
The United States, of course, is a representative democdoctrine, doctrine not preordained by existing Supreme Court precedent. Precedent, however, does guide the Court in many of its constitutional rulings.
See generally Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication:
An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 118-19 (1983)
(noting that the incremental development of constitutional law properly
serves to constrain Supreme Court decision making). Moreover, by relying
upon, distinguishing, or even overruling its prior decisions, the Court serves an
additional function concerning the growth of American moral thought. As the
Court develops its constitutional precedents, it tends to bring together various
strands of the evolving national morality into a body of constitutional doctrine
that is logically consistent and coherent. For example, in its equal-protection
decisions, much of the Court's work involves analogizing different forms of
discrimination to discrimination based on race, a type of discrimination that society clearly recognizes as offensive. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, supra note 167, at 682-734 (discussing equal-protection doctrine governing legislative classifications based on alienage, illegitimacy, gender, and
wealth). In attempting to reconcile and harmonize its constitutional decisions,
the Court is also, in effect, attempting to reconcile and harmonize various aspects of the evolving American morality, a morality that is necessarily protean
but that ought not to be chaotic.
There is a danger, of course, that the Court might "harmonize" its precedents at such a high level of abstraction that the Court would be disregarding
important societal values that should more specifically guide its decision. One
could argue that the Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reflects this type of problem:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.
In a line of decisions, however ....
the Court has recognized that a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution ....
[These decisions]
make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education.
This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted); see Holland, American Liberals and Judicial
Activism: Alexander Bickel's Appeal from the New to the Old, 51 IND. L.J.
1025, 1050 (1976) ("The broadly cited precedents were so far afield and wideranging that they could have been invoked to support virtually anything the
Court was prepared to hold.").
184. See supra text accompanying note 129.
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racy, and majoritarian consent is ordinarily evidenced through
the actions or inactions of elected officials. Before elected officials can consent to a practice, however, they must be aware of
the practice to which they are consenting. Moreover, the officials must have the power to accept or reject the practice, and
they must choose to accept it. I believe that the United States
Congress, having the power to reject it, has knowingly accepted
and continues to accept nonoriginalist review of the basic sort I
have described, thereby satisfying, at least to some degree, the
principle of majoritarian consent. 8 5
The question of congressional knowledge is not merely
whether Congress is aware that the Supreme Court exercises
nonoriginalist review. Proof of that basic knowledge, of course,
is essential for a finding of congressional consent, but it would
not reveal the parameters of such a consent. To determine
those parameters, one must determine the type of nonoriginalist review, if any, of which Congress is aware. As a result, one
must examine more specifically the nature of congressional
perceptions concerning the method by which the Supreme
Court decides issues of individual rights.
Most congressional knowledge about Supreme Court review likely is gained from the Court's published opinions.
Given the public importance of these opinions and their ready
availability, Congress either is,186 or can properly be presumed
to be,187 familiar with the Court's reasoning, at least when the
Court renders important decisions concerning individual rights.
Congress therefore has actual, or at least imputed, knowledge
of the Court's own statements about its method of decision.
A casual reading of the Supreme Court's opinions might
suggest a decision-making process that is purely originalist, for
185. Coming from a body that represents all Americans, Congress's knowing acceptance of the practice embodies the representative consent of the
American polity as a whole. See generally Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Governmen 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954) (arguing that the interests of the states are represented in the national government).
186. A large number of Representatives and Senators, of course, are lawyers; these members of Congress are likely to take a special interest in the
Supreme Court's opinions.
187. Surely Congress-the veritable bastion of American government "by
the people"-has a duty to investigate the basic method by which the judiciary
determines whether majoritarian policies, including those of Congress itself,
will be permitted to stand or instead will be nullified in favor of individual
rights. At the very least, Congress has a duty to examine what the Supreme
Court itself says of its role in defining constitutional rights.
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the Court typically starts its constitutional analysis with a historical examination of the framers' intentions. This is hardly
surprising, however, even for a Court that is willing to exercise
nonoriginalist review. If the original understanding of the Constitution itself calls for an invalidation of the majoritarian practice under attack, the Court's analysis needs to go no further.188
Moreover, even if the originalist inquiry is inconclusive, it may
nonetheless provide relevant guidance in conjunction with
other, nonoriginalist considerations. In other words, even when
the framers' intentions are insufficiently clear to support an
originalist constitutional right, those intentions may tend to
support the recognition of a (nonoriginalistl9) constitutional
right when the pattern of American morality also tends to so
indicate.
Although the modern Court's constitutional analysis generally begins with history, it almost never ends there. The Constitution, as originally understood, properly stands as the
Supreme Court's center of gravity and its point of analytical departure, but the Court's originalist review rarely provides sufficient guidance to justify the recognition of a constitutional
right. Thus, the Court's analysis ordinarily proceeds to other
considerations, considerations that are nonoriginalist in character. For example, although the Court in Brown v. Board of Education1 90 conceded that the history of the fourteenth
amendment did not itself call for an invalidation of segregated
schooling,191 the Court nonetheless went on to invalidate that
practice on the basis of other normative considerations-considerations that necessarily came from some source beyond the
original understanding of the Constitution.192
The Court not only has relied openly on nonoriginalist considerations, it also has described more precisely the role that it
188. But cf. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding legislation that the framers of the contract clause apparently intended
to prevent). For discussions of Blaisdell and the issues that it raises, see Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703,
735-38 (1984); Sandalow, supra note 32, at 1060-68.
189. Recall that nonoriginalist review begins the moment the Court moves
beyond the intentions of the framers, regardless of whether the framers' intentions have first been consulted. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
190. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
191. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36. The Court in Brown observed: "In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson
was written." Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
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claims for itself in the exercise of nonoriginalist review.
Although the Court does not invariably specify the nature of its
nonoriginalist function, it does so more often than some scholars are willing to admit.193 Moreover, when it does speak on
this matter, the Court's descriptions suggest that it in fact exercises nonoriginalist review in a manner similar to that which I

have argued ought to be the case.
In Rochin v. California,194 the Supreme Court held that
California police had violated a criminal suspect's due-process
rights when they administered a stomach pump against his will
to obtain evidence of illicit narcotics. The Court's description of
its constitutional role in individual-rights cases, and especially
under the due-process clause, merits extended quotation:
In dealing not with the machinery of government but with human
rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning,
is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of constitutional provisions. Words being symbols do not speak without a gloss. On the one
hand the gloss may be the deposit of history, whereby a term gains
technical content.. .. On the other hand, the gloss of some of the
verbal symbols of the Constitution does not give them a fixed technical content. It exacts a continuingprocess of application.
When the gloss has thus not been fixed but is a function of the
process of judgment, the judgment is bound to fall differently at different times and differently at the same time through different
judges....
The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave
judges at large. We may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function. Even though the concept of due process of law is not
final and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations that are
fused in the whole nature of our judicial process....
Restraints on our jurisdiction are self-imposed only in the sense
that there is from our decisions no immediate appeal short of impeachment or constitutional amendment. But that does not make due
process of law a matter of judicial caprice. The faculties of the Due
Process Clause may be indefinite and vague, but the mode of their ascertainment is not self-willed. In each case "due process of law" requires an evaluation based on a disinterested inquirypursued in the
spirit ofscience, on a balancedorder offacts exactly andfairly stated,
on the detached consideration of conflicting claims, ... on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the
needs both of continuity and of changes in a progressive society.195

193. See, eg., Berger, supra note 18, at 516 n.344; Bork, supra note 9, at 3-4.
194. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
195. Id. at 169-72 (citing B. CARDOZO, supra note 81) (other citations and
footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); cf. id. at 177-78 (Douglas, J., concurring)
("The evidence obtained from this accused's stomach would be admissible in
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To the same effect is Justice John Harlan's opinion in Poe
v. Ullman,196 which involved a substantive due process challenge to a Connecticut statute criminalizing the use of contra97
ceptives even by married persons:1
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said
is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented
the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the
liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly
has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided
speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are
the traditionsfrom which it developed as well as the traditionsfrom
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this
Court that radically departs from it could not long survive, while a de198
cision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.

The source of decisional norms that Harlan describes is not the
original understanding of the Constitution,199 but neither is it
the judges' own values.200 Rather, it is the "living tradition" of
American historical progress, a concept consistent with what I
have called the pattern of American moral development.201
the majority of states where the question has been raised .... Yet the Court
now says that the rule which the majority of the states have fashioned violates
the 'decencies of civilized conduct.' To that I cannot agree.").
196. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
197. A majority of the Court held that the appeal should be dismissed for
lack of a justiciable "case or controversy." Justice Harlan dissented from this
dismissal and would have found the contraceptive ban unconstitutional. See
id. at 522-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (invalidating the same Connecticut statute as that attacked in Poe).
198. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also
Poe, 367 U.S. at 518 n.9 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that "due process follows the advancing standards of a free society") (citation omitted).
199. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 540 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (observing that the history of the fourteenth amendment "sheds little light" on the meaning of due
process).
200. Justice John Paul Stevens has written:
Some students of the Court take for granted that our decisions
represent the will of the judges rather than the will of the law. This
dogma may be the current fashion, but I remain convinced that such
remarks reflect a profound misunderstanding of the nature of our
work. Unfortunately, however, cynics-parading under the banner of
legal realism-are given a measure of credibility whenever the Court
bases a decision on its own notions of sound policy, rather than on
what the law commands.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1776, 1798 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
201. Indeed, Justice Harlan's specific conclusion in Poe depended on moral
standards arguably drawn from America's contemporary national morality:
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In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,202 the Supreme Court
invalidated a housing ordinance that limited the occupancy of a
dwelling unit to members of a single nuclear family, holding
that the ordinance violated the due process rights of other relatives who wished to live together.203 Writing for a plurality of
four, Justice Lewis Powell quoted Harlan's description of the
Court's function in giving content to the due-process clause,
emphasizing the importance of that function but cautioning as
well that "such judicial intervention [must not be based merely
on] the predilections of those who happen at any time to be
Members of this Court."204 "Appropriate limits on substantive
due process," Powell stated, "come not from drawing arbitrary
lines but rather from careful 'respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society.' "205 Although dissenting from the Court's decision,
But conclusive, in my view, is the utter novelty of this enactment.
Although the Federal Government and many States have at one time
or other had on their books statutes forbidding or regulating the distribution of contraceptives, none, so far as I can find, has made the
use of contraceptives a crime. Indeed, a diligent search has revealed
that no nation, including several which quite evidently share Connecticut's moral policy, has seen fit to effectuate that policy by the means
presented here.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 554-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(footnotes omitted).
In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the plurality opinion suggested a
similar form of analysis in the area of criminal procedure:
[To deny adequate review to the poor means that many of them may
lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions which
appellate courts would set aside. Many States have recognized this
and provided aid for convicted defendants who have a right to appeal
and need a transcript but are unable to pay for it. A few have not.
Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special privileges to none in the administration of its
criminal law.
Id. at 19 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted); cf. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct.
2403, 2412 (1984) (widespread use among the states suggests that a practice
comports with due process). Likewise, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973), four justices argued that sex-based classifications should be found constitutionally "suspect" under the fourteenth amendment's equal-protection
clause, in part because of Congress's passage of the proposed equal-rights
amendment (despite the lack of ratification) and of other legislation "manifest[ing] an increasing sensitivity" to such classifications. See id. at 687-88 (plurality opinion).
202. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
203. See id at 506 (plurality opinion); id. at 521 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment).
204. See id. at 502 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
205. Id. at 503 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring)) (footnote omitted); see also Moore, 431 U.S. at 505
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Justice Byron White did not take issue with the plurality's
method of analysis:
[W]e must always bear in mind that the substantive content of the
[Due Process] Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by
preconstitutional history; that content is nothing more than an accumulated product of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. This is not to suggest, at this point, that any of these
cases should be overruled, or that the process by which they were decided was illegitimate or even unacceptable .... 206

But "the present construction of the Due Process Clause,"
White continued, "represents a major judicial gloss on its
terms, as well as on the anticipation of the Framers."207
The plurality opinion in Moore also suggested that other of
the Court's decisions concerning individual rights, including
those decided under the equal-protection clause, were based on
similar, plainly nonoriginalist, considerations.208 In this, the
opinion reaffirmed what the Court had said in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections:209
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we
have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more
than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was
at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal
2 10
Protection Clause do change.

Citing Brown v. Board of Education's rejection of the "separate-but-equal" doctrine previously endorsed in Plessy v. Ferguson,211 the Court in Harper asserted that equal-protection
claims must be heard with "a contemporary ear."212
n.14 (plurality opinion) ("Recent census reports bear out the importance of
family patterns other than the prototypical nuclear family.").
206. Moore, 431 U.S. at 543-44 (White, J., dissenting).
207. Id at 544 (White, J., dissenting); see id. (White, J., dissenting) (observing that substantive-due-process decisions are made "without express constitutional authority").
208. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 n.10 (plurality opinion). In particular, the opinion referred not only to the Court's recognition of individual rights under the
equal-protection clause, but also to its decisions (selectively) applying the Bill
of Rights to the states, even though its provisions were originally designed
only for application to the federal government. See generally supra note 47.
209. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). In Harper,the Court invalidated Virginia's poll
tax as a violation of the equal-protection clause, noting that "[o]nly a handful
of States" continued to employ such taxes at the time of the Court's decision.
See id at 666 n.4.
210. Id at 669 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
211. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
212. See Harper,383 U.S. at 669; see also id. at 672 (Black, J., dissenting)
("[The Court's] opinion reveals that it [overrules existing precedent] not by using its limited power to interpret the original meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause, but by giving that clause a new meaning ..
");Regents of the Univ.
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The Court often finds some guidance in a historical,
originalist analysis, but then proceeds to consider other, nonhistorical factors as well. In elaborating the eighth amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment,213 for example,
the Supreme Court finds historic support for the general notion
that a punishment must not be disproportionate to the crime. 21 4
The Court gives content to that general prohibition, however,
by "draw[ing] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 225 Thus,
the constitutional prohibition "has been interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner;" 216 it "isnot fastened to the obsolete,
but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."217

The standards to which the

Court refers in these cases, however, are American standards,
not personal ones:
[These constitutional] judgments should not be, or appear to be,
merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be
informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent. To
this end, attention must be given to the public attitudes concerning a
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 404-05 (1978) (Blackmun, J.) (separate opinion)
("I, of course, accept the proposition] that... the Fourteenth Amendment
has expanded beyond its original 1868 concept and now is recognized to have
reached a point where.., it embraces a 'broader principle.' ") (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976)).
213. This prohibition has been applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. See, ag., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
214. See, eg., Solem v. Helm, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3006-07 (1983). The Court's
historical analysis is necessarily based on "very little evidence of the Framers'
intent in including the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause among those
restraints upon the new Government enumerated in the Bill of Rights." See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also
id at 263 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[W]e cannot now know exactly what the
Framers thought 'cruel and unusual punishments' were."); C. Solem v. Helm,
103 S. Ct. at 3021 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Although historians and scholars
have disagreed about the Framers' original intentions, the more common view
seems to be that the Framers viewed the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause as prohibiting the kind of torture meted out during the reign of the
Stuarts.") (footnote omitted).
215. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); cJ: Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 265 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that
the Court has rejected a "'historical' interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause" under which the clause would have been limited to inherently barbarous punishments).
216. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (plurality opinion).
217. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). The Weems decision
might be read as an early harbinger of the modern Supreme Court's approach
to constitutional restraints on government: "Time works changes, brings into
existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must
be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." Id at
373.
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particular sentence-history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and
the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be
2 18
consulted.

Accordingly, the Court's analysis includes a comparison of the
penalty under review with penalties imposed for similar crimes
within the same jurisdiction and in other American jurisdictions as well.219 Consequently, the Court has invalidated the
death penalty for a defendant who aided and abetted a felonymurder but who did not intend that a life be taken, in part because "only about a third of American jurisdictions would ever
permit [such a defendant] to be sentenced to die,"220 and even
those jurisdictions had rarely imposed the penalty.221 Likewise,
the Court has struck down a life sentence for a nonviolent recidivist when the defendant apparently had been "treated more
severely than he would have been in any other State."222 This
type of comparative analysis suggests a rather straightforward
assessment of the contemporary American morality.223
In its eighth amendment cases, the Court has also com218. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). But c.
id. at 597 (plurality opinion) ("These recent events evidencing the attitude of
state legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly determine this controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment
will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.").
219. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3010-11 (1983).
220. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982).
221. See id. at 794-96.
222. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3015 (1983).
223. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976) (plurality opinion) (argument that the contemporary morality condemns the death penalty
for murder held to be undercut by the widespread legislative readoption of
this penalty after the Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972)); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-94 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding the death penalty for rape unconstitutional, in part because only three
states responded to Furman by authorizing such a penalty); see also Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 307 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("We are construing
a living Constitution. The sentence imposed upon the petitioner would be
viewed as grossly unjust by virtually every layman and lawyer.").
In Furman,Justice William Brennan expressed his opinion that America,
over time, has grown to reject the morality of the death penalty:
What was once a common punishment has become, in the context of a
continuing moral debate, increasingly rare. The evolution of this punishment evidences, not that it is an inevitable part of the American
scene, but that it has proved progressively more troublesome to the
national conscience. The result of this movement is our current system of administering the punishment, under which death sentences
are rarely imposed and death is even more rarely inflicted. It is, of
course, "We, the People" who are responsible for the rarity both of
the imposition and the carrying out of this punishment ....
The progressive decline in, and the current rarity of, the inflic-
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pared the penalty under attack with penalties imposed in foreign countries. 22 4 In so doing, the Court may be suggesting that
foreign practices more protective of individual rights than our
own eventually may come to command American acceptance.22 5
Those practices may thus reflect points on the emerging pattern of American morality.226
Perhaps I am overstating the case. Perhaps the Court has
not made it clear that it decides individual-rights cases by a
method akin to reliance on the pattern of American moral detion of death demonstrate that our society seriously questions the appropriateness of this punishment today.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. id. at 410
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("My problem... is the suddenness of the Court's
perception-of progress in the human attitude since decisions of only a short
while ago."). But cf. Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. CL 3154, 3165 (1984) ('The
Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal
laws.").
In a not dissimilar form of analysis under the fourth amendment, the
Court determines whether there has been a "search" or "seizure" triggering
constitutional protections by considering both the history of the amendment
and contemporary societal values:
In assessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individual
privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of
the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, the uses to which the individual has put a location, and our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government
invasion.
Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984) (citations omitted); see id.
at 1740 (noting that the fourth amendment protects "only 'those expectations
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable" ' ) (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
224. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3010-11 (1983).
225. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 371 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("We achieve 'a major milestone in the long road up from barbarism' and
join the approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the world which celebrate
their regard for civilization and humanity by shunning capital punishment")
(footnotes omitted).
226. If moral developments abroad concerning the death penalty in fact
portend moral thinking in the United States, it appears that the Court might
better further the cause of American moral evolution by proscribing the penalty absolutelyThe U.S. is almost the only industrialized nation outside the Communist bloc that still executes people.
Britain first banned the death penalty in 1965, joining such nations as West Germany, Israel and Italy, which had acted in the 1940s
and 1950s. Canada followed suit in 1976 and France in 1981, leaving
the U.S. and Turkey as the only NATO nations with executions.
Death Penalty Free-World Rarity, U.S. Naws & WoRLD REP., July 25, 1983, at
10.
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velopment. Indeed, in many opinions the Court does not elaborate its nonoriginalist mode of analysis at all.227 Nonetheless,
the Court certainly has not ignored "the fundamental question
of the role of judicial review in a democratic society." 228 Moreover, a fair reading of the Court's constitutional decisions
reveals not only that the Court frequently grounds its decisions
on norms beyond those provided by the framers but also that
those norms are not drawn from the justices' individual moral
values. From the Court's own reasoning, then, Congress would
properly conclude, at a minimum, that the Court does exercise
nonoriginalist review and does so by reference to norms derived
from some external source of decision, a source outside the justices' personal schemes of morality.229
Direct evidence of congressional thinking, albeit limited in
quantity, appears to confirm a congressional perception that the
Supreme Court exercises nonoriginalist review by reference to
norms drawn from an external source. The best evidence derives from the periodic legislative efforts to contract the Court's
decision-making jurisdiction and from the congressional reaction to these proposals. One modern effort occurred in the late
227. Often, of course, the Court is merely refining the contours of a constitutional right recognized by prior decisions, and its reasoning may therefore
depend largely on existing precedent. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1983) (commenting that "the
doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the
rule of law") (footnote omitted); see also supra note 183.
228. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 466 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist aptly posed the question in the following terms: "How
can government by the elected representatives of the people co-exist with the
power of the federal judiciary, whose members are constitutionally insulated
from responsiveness to the popular will, to declare invalid laws duly enacted
by the popular branches of government?" Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
229. Congress might inaccurately conclude that the Supreme Court's authority to render decisions going beyond the framers' particular intentions is
somehow traceable to the historic adoption of the Constitution, see supra note
20, or that the Court's decision-making role is based on a broad view of
"originalism," giving effect to the framers' "general" or "broad" goals, see
supra text accompanying notes 41-46; cf. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
241 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that "our use of the history of
[the framers'] time must limit itself to broad purposes, not specific practices").
Even if Congress were so misinformed, however, it would be misinformed only
as to the perceived basis of judicial authority for a method of constitutional decision not tied to historical considerations. It would not be misinformed as to
the method of decision itself. As long as Congress has the power to accept or
reject that method of decision, see infra text accompanying notes 244-55, congressional beliefs concerning how or why the Court has claimed the authority
to use such a method are largely beside the point.
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1950's, when the Jenner-Butler bill responded to Supreme
Court decisions concerning antisubversive laws by proposing to
eliminate the Court's jurisdiction to hear certain constitutional
challenges.230 More recently, numerous jurisdiction-limiting
bills have been introduced attacking the Court's decisions concerning abortion, school prayer, and busing for school desegregation.2 3 ' To date, no modern bill has been enacted.232
Looking -first to the congressional advocates of these various proposals, surely they believe the Supreme Court relies on
norms beyond those constitutionalized by the framers. Indeed,
the common purpose of these efforts is "to halt the incursions
of the Court into the legislative field,"233 to stop the Court from
"distorting the work of the authors of the Constitution."4
Many of those who attack the Court doubtless believe not only
230. See S. 2646, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
231. For partial listings of these proposals, see supra note 138.
232. Following the Civil War, Congress did enact legislation depriving the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings alleging constitutional violations. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
233. See 104 CONG. REc. S4424 (1958) (statement of Sen. Jenner); see also
128 CONG. REC. S7518 (daily ed. June 24, 1982) (statement of Sen. East) (claiming that "the Court has taken it upon itself to mandate social legislation"); 127
CONG. REc. S6592 (daily ed. June 19, 1981) (statement of Sen. Helms) ("Some
of us have been saying for years that the Federal courts have been legislating
instead of adjudicating.").
234. See 127 CONG. REC. S1282 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1981) (statement of Sen.
Helms); see also 128 CONG. REC. E4861 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1982) (statement of
Rep. Crane) (complaining that "the Federal courts have overstepped their
boundaries by focusing on the creation of policy"); 127 CONG. REc. E5368 (daily
ed. Nov. 17, 1981) (statement of Rep. Ashbrook) (noting that "unelected Federal judges... have chosen not to interpret the law but to make new law");
126 CONG. REC. 23,791 (1980) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating that the
Supreme Court's consideration of policy issues in constitutional cases "is an
entirely illegitimate way for a court of law to behave"); 104 CONG. REC. S18664
(1958) (statement of Sen. Butler) ('The Supreme Court is not supposed to
change the Constitution ... ."); icL at S18680 (statement of Sen. Thurmond)
('The time is long past due for action by the Congress to call a halt to this
unconstitutional seizure of power by the third branch of the Government.");
cf.126 CONG. REc. 29,477 (1980) (printed at request of Sen. Helms) (" 'In virtually all cases that actually come to the Supreme Court for decision, there is
nothing in the Constitution to indicate how the conflict of principles or values
should be resolved.'") (quoting Graglia, The Supreme Court'sAbuse of Power).
During a 1980 debate, Senator Hatch requested that the following statement
be printed in the CongressionalRecord:
"Over the past twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has been
racing ahead of other governmental institutions in effecting changes
in national social policy and in society itself. Indeed, the Court has
been fashioning a national social policy for the first time... through
the succession of controversial Supreme Court decisions on desegregation, reapportionment, school prayer, capital punishment, criminal
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that the Court's review is nonoriginalist but also that the
Court's decisions are based on the justices' personal values.235

Whatever the views of these advocates, however, they cannot
support the conclusion that Congress has consented to the
Court's nonoriginalist function, for these members of Congress
would reject that function.
The more relevant inquiry is into the beliefs of those who
have successfully defended the Supreme Court's decisionmaking role by opposing limitations on the Court's jurisdiction.
Some of the Court's congressional defenders equate the Court
' 36 thus arguably exand its decisions with "the Constitution,"2
pressing a belief that the Court's role is originalist only. In the
full context of their arguments, however, it appears more likely
that they are defending a process of decision making, a process
that, although nonoriginalist, has grown to become a basic, organic part of the American constitutional system. 237 In reprocedure, school busing, pornography, abortion and reverse discrimination ....

"Such a role for 'the judicial power' is not provided for in the
Constitution nor was it ever contemplated by the Constitutional Convention of 1787."
126 CONG. REc. 25,305 (1980) (printed at request of Sen. Hatch) (quoting Ascik,
Heritage Foundation report (June 25, 1980)).

235. See Cohodas, Members Move to Rein in Supreme Court, CONG. Q.,
May 30, 1981, at 947, 948 (" 'The federal judiciary has been courting constitutional disaster by reading its own predilections into the nation's foundational
document.' ") (quoting Sen. Hatch); see also 104 CONG. REC. S18646 (1958)
(statement of Sen. Butler) (contending that the Supreme Court has "sought to
substitute the Court's judgment.. . for the judgment of the Founding Fathers
with respect to the meaning and effect of the Constitution of the United
States."); cf. id at S18645 (statement of Sen. Jenner) ("Now, by the JennerButler bill we are asking Congress to protect itself and the country against the
usurpation of this runaway, wild Court, which is tearing down the Constitution of the United States.").
On this particular issue, these antagonists of the Supreme Court find
themselves in agreement with Professor Perry, a strong supporter of judicial
activism. It seems that constitutional theory, like politics, is the maker of
strange bedfellows. See generally O'Fallon, supra note 122, at 719.
236. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REc. S11620 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1982) (statement of
Sen. Baucus) ("[I]f we ever pass a statute which prohibits the U.S. Supreme
Court from reviewing any constitutional issue, we shall be sliding down the
slippery slope toward obliteration and destruction not only of the Supreme
Court, but the U.S. Constitution.").
237. See 104 CONG. REC. S18680 (1958) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("The
very essence of constitutional government requires a final court to determine
what is and what is not the paramount law of the land. Congress cannot do it
by amendments which it adopts day in and day out, and year in and year
out."); id. at S18683 (statement of Sen. Wiley) ("[T]o do violence to the American tradition by denigrating the eminence and the prestige, the honor and the
power of the Supreme Court of the United States, is to do violence to the con-
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sponding to the Court's antagonists in 1958, for example,
Senator Javits hardly portrayed an originalist Court:
[The Jenner-Butler] bill is based upon a misconception of the nature
of the Constitution of the United States and the function which the
Court performs in interpreting it.
One ground of complaint against the Court appears to be that in
deciding constitutional questions it refuses to be bound solely by
precedents ....
The fundamental question, I believe, is: Should legal philosophy
be compatible with changes in the social development of the country;
or must legal philosophy follow what we lawyers call stare
decisis...?
...
I think the people will want the Supreme Court to remain
unimpaired and to take actions compatible with the Constitution and
with the conditions existing in the country, as regards public opinion
[O]ne of the finest traditions of [the legal profesand influence ....
sion] is to make sure that the weak, the oppressed, the unpopular,
those whom the public may wish to run out of town on a rail, enjoy
the same fundamental human rights and constitutional rights which
we expect to have conferred upon every citizen. We have learned the
hard way that only in that way can the individual be protected; and
that goes for every individual, including those who now may be highly
dissatisfied with many of the Court's decisions.

[Ilt is the appropriatefunction of the Supreme Court of the
...
United States to interpret the provisions of our Constitution in the
light of changing time and conditions.238

Speaking on the same bill, Senator Hennings argued:
We know that the Court itself divides. We know that many of
these questions are indeed very close questions of law. We know that
the law is not immutable, but is protean. It changes constantly to conform to human progress and to the advances made in this great land
of ours, all of which are to the advantage of society and for the safety,
security, and welfare of the people. Therefore, all of these factors
bear upon the question. The Supreme Court does not rigidly hand
down opinion after opinion predicated upon something that happened
100 years ago and law that was laid down 100 years ago. The Supreme
Court must consider many diverse factors that arise in the course of
human events....
We have many statutes which must be interpreted afresh and
239
looked at anew by the Court because of the advance of society.
cept of freedom and by that much to throw dust in the face of the whole Free
World in a moment of its acutest peril."); id. at S18685 (statement of Sen. Hennings) ("[The Jenner-Butler bill] is contrary to our historic principle that the
Supreme Court should have the final word as to the constitutionality of governmental action.").
238. Id. at S7844-45, S7849 (statement of Sen. Javits) (emphasis added).
239. Id. at S18684-85 (statement of Sen. Hennings); see 127 CONG. REC.
S13063 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1981) (statement of Sen. Mitchell) ('The Federal
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Although the evidence suggests that the Supreme Court's
defenders are well aware that the Court's constitutional review
is nonoriginalist, there is no evidence that they believe the
Court acts upon the moral values of the justices. To the contrary, they are defending "a government of laws, not a government of men."240 Unlike many of the Court's antagonists, its
defenders believe that the justices of the Supreme Court decide
constitutional cases by a process of judicial reasoning, not by
grafting their personal values into the Constitution.241 The former is considered legitimate, the latter is not;242 and the
courts do and should develop constitutional law."); see also S. REP. No. 1586,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1958) (individual views of Sen. Dirksen) ("[T]he
Supreme Court [should] continue to be the guardian of individual rights and
the final arbiter on any question of possible exercise of arbitrary power against
any of our citizens."); 127 CONG. REC. S7237 (daily ed. July 8, 1981) (statement
of Sen. Moynihan) ("The Constitution is more than a law. It is the basic understanding the American people have reached with themselves on how to
govern and how to be governed, and it has endured."); 104 CONG. REC. S18682
(1958) (statement of Sen. Wiley) ("The very strength of the Supreme Court, as
the very strength of democratic government, rests in the capacity to substitute
a new right for an old wrong.").
240. See 104 CONG. REC. S7848 (1958) (statement of Sen. Javits).
241. Although their perceptions otherwise differ, however, the Court's defenders and its antagonists both recognize the obvious: that the Supreme
Court goes beyond the framers' intentions and recognizes constitutional rights
based at least in part on other, nonoriginalist considerations. See M. PERRY,
supra note 2, at 141 (observing that significant segments of the polity, including members of Congress, are "well aware that the Court's most controversial
constitutional decisions-the decisions that engage the polity's attention in the
first place-are compelled by neither constitutional text nor original understanding"); see also, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. S6646 (daily ed. June 22, 1981) (statement of Sen. Johnston) (describing school-desegregation decisions as "a brave
experiment of the Court, taken as against a background of the overriding national need to eliminate segregation"); 126 CONG. REC. 29,476-77 (1980) (statement of Sen. Hollings) ("I believe very strongly that there is no doubt that we
are not constitutionally going backward on civil liberties or civil rights."); 104
CONG. REC. S18693 (1958) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (claiming that "the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to decisions in constitutional matters ... ,
[which] may be changed at any moment") (paraphrasing Justice Douglas); id.
at S18694 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (asserting that "the Supreme Court says it
does not stand by decisions on constitutional questions"); cf. 127 CONG. REC.
S7403 (daily ed. July 9, 1981) (statement of Sen. Durenberger) (arguing that,
in light of a perceived curtailment by the Supreme Court of its judicial role,
"[o]ur past practice of avoiding an issue in the hope that it will be settled in
the courts is no longer viable"). See generally 104 CONG. REC. S18692 (1958)
(statement of Sen. Lausche) ("We look upon the Court as the repository of all
that is right and good.").
242. Cf. 104 CONG. REC. S18646 (1958)(statement of Sen. Butler) ("The
question is . . . whether the Supreme Court will be required to return to its
original role-to serve solely as a judicial institution.").
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Court's defenders, unlike its antagonists, generally believe that
the Court has remained within its legitimate judicial function.
To date, the prevailing forces in Congress have resisted efforts to restrict the role of the Supreme Court by contracting
its jurisdiction, apparently with a recognition that the Court engages in nonoriginalist review but with no thought that the
Court might be recognizing constitutional rights by reference to
the justices' own moral values. Although the direct evidence of
congressional perceptions is not overwhelming, it does tend to
confirm a congressional understanding similar to that which
might be gleaned from the Supreme Court's published opinions.
It thus seems a fair conclusion, if not an inescapable one, that
the members of Congress who have successfully opposed the
various jurisdictional proposals have been aware that the Court
draws decisional norms from some nonoriginalist, but external,
source of decision.243
Despite its knowledge of the Supreme Court's basic
method of decision, Congress has not acted to curb the Court's
decision-making role. Congress's knowledge and inaction, however, are insufficient to establish congressional, and thereby
majoritarian, consent to the Court's exercise of nonoriginalist
review. Congress must also have the power to reject the practice and must know of its power.
In identifying the source of congressional power to control
the Supreme Court, I join Perry and others before him, in relying primarily on the exceptions clause of article 11.244 Under
243. This conclusion is supported not only by the available direct evidence
but also, and alternatively, on the ground that Congress is, or can be presumed
to be, familiar with the Supreme Court's statements concerning its mode of
constitutional decision. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text; see also
supra text accompanying notes 188-229.
244. See M PERRY, supra note 2, at 128-39; C. BLACK, supra note 169, at 1719, 37-39; Black, The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L REv. 841,
845-47 (1975); Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1043, 1048 (1977); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution,65 COLUBM.
L. REV. 1001, 1004-07 (1965).
As Perry notes in his book, controls such as the process of judicial appointment and that of constitutional amendment are inadequate to reconcile
nonoriginalist review with the principle of majoritarian consent. See supra
note 88 and accompanying text. In a new essay, however, Perry has reversed
his position, asserting that "[t]he various mechanisms of political control or influence over the Court... are adequate even if the Court refuses to concede
to Congress the broad jurisdiction-limiting power I discussed in my book." M.
Perry, supra note 25, at - (footnote omitted). But Perry suggests no alternative method by which the popular branches can exercise the same type of
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this provision, Congress is expressly authorized to make legislative "exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,
thereby controlling the Supreme Court's constitutional agenda
by regulating the types of cases and issues the Court can decide.245 I likewise agree with Perry that the much-discussed
theoretical limitations on this congressional power 2 46 do not apply to nonoriginalist review. As Perry observes, "no value judgment constitutionalized by the framers forbids Congress to use
its jurisdiction-limiting power as a means of exerting control
over the constitutional-policymaking activities of the federal judiciary," and no other justification would support the Supreme
Court in any attempt to invalidate legislation restricting only
247
the Court's opportunity to exercise nonoriginalist review.
meaningful control over the Supreme Court. It appears that Perry's new essay
simply reflects a lesser concern for the principle of majoritarian consent.
245. What I say of the exceptions clause applies as well to Congress's
power to control the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. See supra note
89.
246. Scholars have suggested at least three potential limitations on the
power of Congress to control the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. First, there Is
general agreement that jurisdictional legislation is invalid if it directly violates
specific constitutional prohibitions, such as those found in the Bill of Rights.
Second, based in part on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), some commentators contend that Congress
can only control the general classes of cases that come before the Court and
cannot use selective jurisdictional legislation in an attempt to influence substantive constitutional doctrine. Finally, Professor Henry Hart has argued
that Congress cannot restrict jurisdiction to the point that it destroys "the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan." See Hart, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953). See generally J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 167, at 43-52; C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
CouRTs 32-39 (4th ed. 1983); Gunther, CongressionalPower to Curtail Federal
CourtJurisdiction. An OpinionatedGuide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 895 (1984); Sager, supra note 138. For a recent article flush with important new ideas concerning the original understanding of article III, see Clinton, supra note 138.
247. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 128; see also id. at 128-33. I agree with
Perry that, in theory, Congress's authority to restrict the Supreme Court's
originalistfunction might not be plenary. See id. at 129-30; see also supra note
246. The sorts of constitutional decisions that would trigger a public outcry
leading to jurisdiction-limiting legislation, however, would almost certainly be
nonoriginalist in character. Thus, the problem of distinguishing originalist
from nonoriginalist review for the purpose of testing the validity of jurisdictional legislation is largely "imaginary." See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 130;
see also infra text accompanying notes 248-51. But cf. M. Perry, supra note 25,
at - n.89 (contending that "as a practical matter" the authority of Congress
would have to cover originalist as well as nonoriginalist review).
Perry does accept one limitation on Congress's power to control non.
originalist review. Following conventional wisdom, Perry assumes that Con-
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More important than the theoretical legal issues surrounding the exceptions clause, however, are the political realities
that govern the relationship between Congress and the Court.
Given Congress's general reluctance to use the exceptions
clause to counteract Supreme Court decision making,248 any
jurisdiction-limiting enactment doubtless would follow only
from a massive popular movement against the Court.249 In
such a political environment, it is all but inconceivable that the
Supreme Court could prevail in a direct confrontation with
gress could not impose jurisdictional restrictions on state courts mirroring any
that might be imposed on the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.
See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 131. If this view is correct, then any congressional judgment disfavoring the exercise of nonoriginalist review under the
federal constitution might not be given full effect, for state courts might continue to hear the disfavored constitutional challenges and might continue to
honor the congressionally rejected Supreme Court precedents. See Ranii, Congress Warned by Top State Judges Not to Curb Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 15, 1982, at 7, col. 1; Sager, supra note 138, at 40-41; see also
Auerbach, supra note 5, at 160-63; Lupu, supra note 41, at 612-15. See generally M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 131-32, 136 n.* (explaining why these problems
do not fatally undercut the effectiveness of the congressional power).
I think Perry and the conventional wisdom are wrong. It is true that, in
theory, Congress might not be permitted to restrict state courts in their exercise of originalistreview under the federal constitution. C. Sager, supra note
138, at 41 n.70 (arguing that the removal of both state and federal jurisdiction
to hear constitutional challenges would violate due process). But there is no
reason why Congress, acting, for example, under the broad reach of its commerce power, could not adopt federal legislation, binding on state as well as
federal courts, rejecting nonoriginalistreview purportedly grounded on the
federal constitution and rejecting any state-law policies to the contrary. Cf.
The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 429 (1867) (holding that Congress has
the power to deprive state courts of jurisdiction by granting exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts "in all cases to which the judicial power of the United
States extends"). See generally Wechsler, supra note 185 (arguing that the
states are protected through the national political process). Moreover, because
it is almost inconceivable that Congress would move to restrict jurisdiction in
anything but a nonoriginalist context, any limitation on its authority over
state-court originalistreview is essentially beside the point.
248. As to why Congress has been (properly) reluctant, see supra text accompanying notes 137-45; see also infra text accompanying notes 269-71.
249. Senator Eastland has outlined the necessary circumstances:
[When the people feel that justice is no longer certain, that their
courts are breaking with precedent, and are tearing down the bulwarks of judicial continuity, they are rightly restless and apprehensive. But even under such circumstances, they are not likely to rise
against the courts unless the judicial departure from settled conclusions adversely affects the rights of the people or endangers their liberties. In such an instance, the wrath of the people is cumulative,
focusing itself first against the particular decisions which oppress
them or threaten to denude them of their rights or endanger their
safety;, and then, inevitably, against the court itself.
104 CONG. REC. S18679 (1958) (statement of Sen. Eastland).
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America's most broadly based democratic institution.250 As a
result, it is all but inconceivable that the Court would attempt
to exercise jurisdiction in the face of a congressional command
to abstain.251
Moreover, the evidence suggests that Congress is well
aware of its ultimate power over the Supreme Court. Although
the legislative debates on jurisdictional proposals frequently include technical arguments concerning the legal scope of the exceptions clause,252 they also include numerous references to the
undeniable congressional power to control the excesses of a
Supreme Court gone astray. 253 In arguing against a 1979 proposal to strip the Court of jurisdiction in school-prayer cases, for
example, Senator Kennedy readily conceded Congress's power
over the judiciary:
No one really questions that we in this body have the power effectively to destroy the judiciary. We could do that by curtailing or
eliminating the authorization and appropriations for U.S. attorneys,
for the Federal judges, for magistrates, for the court buildings, for all
the mechanisms which permit our Federal system to function. No
one denies that we have at least that power.
The question is, Mr. President, whether, by the exercise of that
250. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(noting that "the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power"); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 350 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke
ed. 1961) ("[I]t is not possible to give each department an equal power of self
defence. In republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates."). See generally A. NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITI.
GATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE 237 (1982) (arguing that "the legitimacy of judicial
policy-making power is validated by inherent judicial powerlessness").
251. As Justice Rehnquist has written:
The exercise of jurisdiction over a case which Congress has provided
shall terminate before reaching this Court . . . is a serious matter.

The imperative that other branches of Government obey our duly issued decrees is weakened whenever we decline, for whatever reason
other than the exercise of our own constitutional duties, to adhere to
the decrees of Congress and the Executive.
Jeffries v. Barksdale, 453 U.S. 914, 916 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
252. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. S11148-57 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1982); id. at
S10854-56 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982); id. at S8498-504 (daily ed. July 16, 1982);
id at S6746-48 (daily ed. June 14, 1982); id. at S2255-69 (daily ed. Mar. 17,
1982); id. at S1321-23 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1982); 104 CONG. REC. S18652-55 (1958);
see also Cohodas, supra note 235 (discussing the divergent legal arguments of
academics who appeared before congressional subcommittees in 1981).
253. The political power of Congress is not self-legitimating; i.e., it is not
necessarily legitimate for Congress to exercise the power that it has. See
supra note 6. But the power of Congress, in itself, does tend to legitimate the
Supreme Court's practice of nonoriginalist review by providing a means of accommodating that practice with the principle of majoritarian consent.
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power, we should reduce and impact the jurisdiction
judiciary.25 4

of the

Indeed, those in Congress who question the constitutionality of
jurisdictional legislation invariably combine legal arguments
with policy arguments, suggesting that their legal doubts are
not critical to their legislative positions. 255
If, as I contend, Congress knows of the Supreme Court's
practice of nonoriginalist review and knows of its own power to
reject that practice, Congress's failure to act suggests a representative majoritarian consent, or at least acquiescence, to the
role that the Supreme Court claims for itself in American society. This consent, however, does not extend beyond the
Supreme Court's decision making by reference to external
sources of nonoriginalist constitutional norms, because the
Court's congressional supporters have no reason to believe that
If, as
the justices look to an internal source of decision.2
Perry maintains, the Court is covertly basing its constitutional
decisions on the justices' personal moral values, it is engaging
in a grossly offensive form of intellectual dishonesty, deceiving
Congress and the American people about a very basic aspect of
our government. Without judicial candor concerning the
Court's method of decision there can be no congressional
knowledge. And without knowledge there can be no
254. 125 CONG. REC. S7631 (1979) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see 128
CONG. REC. S2255 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982) (statement of Sen. East) ("One
might question the prudence in certain situations of exercising [our article HI]
power, but the question of whether we have it or not certainly is not and could
not be a debatable item."); 104 CONG. REc. S18679 (1958) (statement of Sen.
Javits) ("Congress can deprive the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction;
Congress has that power."); see also infra note 269.
255. See e.g., 128 CONG. REC. S10791 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1982) (statement of
Sen. Packwood) (after expressing legal doubts concerning Congress's authority:. 'But if we have the power, it is not wise policy ... ."); id at S6747 (daily
ed. June 14, 1982) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) ("If the constitutionality of
these jurisdiction-stripping bills is unclear, [it is clear] that they are a profoundly bad idea ...."); id at S2245 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982) (statement of
Sen. Mitchell) ("I believe that these bills are both unwise and unconstitutional."); i&i at S1323 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1982) (statement of Sen. Bumpers) ("I
think what we are doing is wrong as a matter of constitutional law and as a
matter of sound public policy."). Not surprisingly, supporters of the legislative
attacks on the Supreme Court may be less concerned about the niceties of
technical legal arguments. See e.g., 104 CONG. REc. S18651 (1958) (statement
of Sen. Butler) ("I, for one, am perfectly willing to send legislation to that
Court today, if I can do it, and let them declare it unconstitutional; and then
the people will rise up and demand that Congress be given back its inherent
power to legislate.").
256. See supra text accompanying notes 186-243.
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consent. 257
Taking the Court at its word, however, the Court's nonoriginalist function more closely tracks my suggested model
than the one advanced by Perry: it engages the Court in a
search for national values that mark the developing moral progress of American society, values that come from beyond the
justices' personal schemes of right and wrong. Congress is
aware of the basic contours of this model and has the power to
reject it, but has yet to act, suggesting at least some measure of
majoritarian consent to the Supreme Court's nonoriginalist
role. Such consent may resolve, or at least mitigate, the overriding problem of legitimacy that I have addressed in this
Article.
This theory of congressional consent, of course, is far from
perfect. There is but limited evidence of Congress's beliefs concerning the Supreme Court's practice of nonoriginalist review
and concerning Congress's power to control that practice. Further, legislative inaction as the basis for a finding of consent is
much less compelling than a positive affirmation of approval.
The strength of this evidence of majoritarian consent, however,
must be evaluated against the countermajoritarian dangers
posed by the asserted model of nonoriginalist review. The
model I have described is countermajoritarian; it takes the
Supreme Court beyond originalism and provides the Court with
a broad opportunity to invalidate majoritarian decisions. This
model, however, also limits the Court to an external source of
decisional norms, indeed, a source that is "majoritarian" in the
sense that it derives from American values, albeit values that
may conflict with the will of temporary or local majorities.258
Although the model therefore creates a tension with the principle of consent, it is a tension much less pronounced than, for
example, that created by Perry's expansive judicial role. Accordingly, the evidence of congressional consent must only be
persuasive enough to overcome the model's definite but limited
countermajoritarian dangers. I believe that the evidence meets
that burden.
257.

Cf. C. BLACK, supra note 169, at 27 ("[O]ne question remains: Is this

congressional entrustment of power to the Court the result of sham, of an in-

duced illusion that there is serious meaning in the idea of 'decision according
to law'?").
258.

See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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CONGRESS AS THE SUPREME COURT'S SILENT PARTNER:
DELICATE BALANCE OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT

A

The existence of a congressional power to silence the
Supreme Court is essential to any constitutional theory that
gives meaningful weight to the principle of majoritarian consent. It is, in the words of Professor Charles L. Black, "the
rock on which rests the legitimacy of the judicial work in a democracy." 259 On this much Perry and I agree. 260 But we again
part company in assessing the basis on which Congress should
properly exercise its ultimate power over the Court.
The relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court
is extraordinarily delicate. In modern times, Congress has permitted the Court to exercise the full measure of its nonoriginalist function, thereby granting the Court an uninhibited
opportunity to further the cause of American moral growth.
The uniform rejection by Congress of jurisdiction-limiting legislation has significance far beyond the particular subjects of the
various proposals. By defeating these measures, Congress has
preserved the stature and independence of the Supreme Court,
has preserved inviolate the Court's role as the expositor of our
nation's constitutional values. Indeed, the modem failure of
jurisdiction-limiting legislation has itself become a vital feature
on the American constitutional landscape, and the future enactment of even a single proposal might irreversibly alter the basic
character of our constitutional system.
Because of the uniform rejection of jurisdictional legislation in the recent past, the success of any proposal in the future necessarily would carry a strong condemnation of the
Supreme Court, an implicit if not explicit statement that the
Court had egregiously erred-that the Court had acted so recklessly as to move outside the proper scope of its decisional authority. Such a statement would signal dramatic problems
within the Supreme Court, and the Court's institutional stature
would be forever weakened.261 Moreover, any single legislative
259. See Black, supra note 244, at 846. I thus agree that "those people are
very badly mistaken who think they strengthen the position of the Court by
arguing that its jurisdiction is outside congressional control." See id. at 847
(emphasis in original).
260. But see supra note 244.
261. Speaking in opposition to the Jenner-Butler bill, Senator Wiley stated:
What the sponsors of this measure are saying is not that the Supreme
Court has decided wrongly-which may or may not very well be
true-but what the sponsors of this measure are, in effect, saying is
that the Supreme Court as an institution is itself wrong and needs
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success would break the pattern of uniform rejection and significantly decrease the burden for subsequent proponents of additional legislation. One step inevitably would lead to another,
and that to a third.262 Indeed, I do not think it extravagant to
suggest that a single congressional enactment might portend
the eventual destruction of the Supreme Court's present role in
American society. 263 Accordingly, the need for congressional
restraint cannot be overstated.264
For Perry, however, the congressional power to control the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction would invite Congress to monitor
therefore to be reduced to a zero, or near-zero, in the structure of our
government.
104 CONG. REc. S18682 (1958) (statement of Sen. Wiley).
262. See 128 CONG. REC. S2227 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982) (statement of Sen.

Mathias) ("Once you go down this road, once you take this route, there is no
area of human endeavor that could not be reached by a simple act of Congress
altering the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to control the outcome of
cases."); id. at S2250 (statement of Sen. Levin) ("[T]hese bills . . . undermine
the independence of the judicial branch and set a dangerous precedent which
could lead to the eventual demise of our democratic form of government."); id.
at S2251 (statement of Sen. Goldwater) ("What particularly troubles me about
trying to override constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court by a simple
bill is that I see no limit to the practice."); id at S1047 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1982)
(statement of Sen. Baucus) ("If Congress decides to endorse this approach, the
pressure to respond to a wider range of constitutional issues will grow. Every
constituency that feels victimized by an adverse constitutional ruling will come
running to Congress for a jurisdiction withdrawal bill.").
263. As Senator Moynihan has noted:
When you say that there are matters the Court may not consider, you
say it is less than a court; much less a Supreme Court. You are saying
the Court acts at the toleration and on the terms set by this body; that
this body becomes the supreme arbiter of what may be judged and
what may not.
At that point a profound constitutional transformation takes
place, a constitutional transmutation. We are not thereafter the same
Republic we have been.
127 CONG. REC. S7237 (daily ed. July 8, 1981) (statement of Sen. Moynihan);
cf. 128 CONG. REC. S2242 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (stating that jurisdictional bills would "change the concept of this Nation's government"); id at S2253 (statement of Sen. Hart) ("The issue at stake
is our basic constitutional structure.").
264. As Senator Dodd has explained:
The most important issue, I believe, in this debate is this very delicate relationship that exists among the executive, the legislative, and
the judicial branches of Government. That debate is probably the
most significant debate, because none of us here wants in any way to
upset the delicate balance that, for the most part, has existed over
these past 200 years.
127 CONG. REC. S7260 (daily ed. July 8, 1981) (statement of Sen. Dodd); cf 104
CONG. REC. S7848 (1958) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("Do we want to break
down all [our] self-discipline because some of us-perhaps including myselfare dissatisfied with some Supreme Court decisions? Is it not our highest duty
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the substantive propriety of the Court's individual-rights decisions on a continuing case-by-case basis.265 Although Perry believes that Congress would rarely exercise its power,266 such
congressional restraint would be highly improbable if, as Perry
suggests, the Court were to base its constitutional decisions on
the justices' personal moral values.267 Indeed, I believe that
any congressional oversight of the substantive content of the
Court's particular decisions, decisions that are frequently controversial and unpopular, would eventually lead to the enactment of jurisdictional legislation, legislation carrying the seeds
8
of a possible constitutional disaster.26
If Congress should not exercise its power under the exceptions clause to express its disagreement with particular decisions, under what circumstances should it exercise this
power?269 Earlier I suggested an explanation for the absence of
in the exercise of self-discipline, in this real work of our Government, to stand
by these fundamental institutions?").
Another factor might also counsel legislative restraint: if Congress chose
to adopt jurisdictional legislation that left state-court jurisdiction intact, the
state courts might continue to exercise the disfavored nonoriginalist review,
raising potential problems concerning the continuing effect of federal constitutional precedents in the state courts and concerning the uniformity of this
"federal" law. See generally supra note 247.
265. See M. PERRY,supra note 2, at 133 (referring to jurisdictional legislation as a way of "undoing particular constitutional policies established by the
federal judiciary," ".a way of dealing with . . . unpopular Supreme Court
decison[s]"); see also id. at 220 n.181 (suggesting that congressional oversight
might be considered "'a form of extraordinary appellate review'") (quoting
Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 (1978)).
266. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 132, 134.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 137-50.
268. Cf.104 CONG. REc. S18683 (1958) (statement of Sen. Wiley) ("Let us
not ... kill the principle of the Supreme Court because we differ, even bitterly, with some of the decisions of the present Justices.").
269. By suggesting that Congress should limit its use of the exceptions
clause, I do not mean to imply any limitation on the power of Congress to use
that clause in response to nonoriginalist decisions. Rather, I am suggesting
that it would be imprudent for Congress to exercise its power except under
the conditions that I discuss in the text:
[W]hat is permissible is not always wise. Simply because we can do it
does not mean that we should. Simply because we have the power
does not mean that it is good for our Nation. Congress must resist
temptation to adjust the jurisdiction of the lower Federal courts, or of
all Federal courts, to respond to particular decisions of the Supreme
Court.
128 CONG. REC. S10857 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see
also id. (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting that "it would be a tragedy for Congress to forego the self-restraint that has united each generation with the
next"); id. at S1041 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1982) (statement of Sen. Goldwater)
('Whether or not Congress possesses the power of curbing judicial authority,
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any modern jurisdiction-limiting legislation. That discussion is
equally pertinent here:
Most members of Congress, like their constituents, believe that the
Supreme Court has a special role in deciding constitutional cases, such
that the Court's decisions concerning individual rights ought not to be
disturbed by the majoritarian process. They respect the Supreme
Court as a court of law, a court that they perceive to make principled
constitutional decisions through traditional legal reasoning and analysis. To be sure, most members of Congress must recognize that the
Court engages in nonoriginalist review by referring to norms beyond
those supplied by the framers. The Court can engage in such review
without losing congressional respect, however, as long as the norms to
which it refers derive from sources perceived as appropriate for con2 70
stitutional decision making.

This explanation of past congressional inaction also suggests
the basis on which Congress should use its exceptions-clause
power. Because of the Supreme Court's important function in
constitutional cases and the probable crippling effect of jurisdictional legislation, Congress should demand a strong justification before adopting such legislation. In particular,
congressional dissatisfaction with the substantive results of any
one or more constitutional decisions should not be enough; instead, Congress should move against the Court only if it wishes
27
to reject the method of the Court's decision-making process. 1
I believe that Congress has accepted, and should continue
to accept, a method of judicial review under which the Supreme
Court draws decisional norms from the pattern of American
moral development. Through this general acceptance of the
process by which the Court renders its decisions, Congress
clothes the countermajoritarian Supreme Court with a mantle
of majoritarian legitimacy.272 By refusing to exercise its power
we should not invoke it."); 104 CONG. REC. S18679 (1958) (statement of Sen.
Javits) ("Congress has (the] power, but should have the self-discipline not to
exercise it.").
270. See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.
271. Cf.128 CONG. REC. S10854 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Packwood) ("'Only if we are prepared to say that the Court has become intolerable in a fundamentally democratic society and that there is no prospect
whatever for getting it to behave properly should we adopt a principle which
contains within it the seeds of the destruction of the Court's entire constitutional role.' ") (quoting Professor Robert Bork).
272. Compare the argument of Professor Leonard W. Levy:
Long acquiescence by the people and their representatives has legitimated judicial review. It was "not imposed by self-anointed fiat on
an unwilling people." Despite periodic and sometimes intense attacks
on the Court by Congress or the White House, judicial review has survived unscathed for over a century and a half. Even the brief and
unique encounter with Congress's controlling power over the Court's
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under the exceptions clause, Congress thus acts in a unique
partnership with the Supreme Court, a partnership that permits a democratic society to reach beyond its majoritarian values without forsaking its ultimate commitment to those values.
But the partnership has two partners. In return for legislative restraint, the Supreme Court must retain the respect of
Congress. The Court must engage in a process of legal analysis
worthy of the highest judicial institution in America. In the exercise of nonoriginalist judicial review, the Court must ground
its decisions on norms that come from beyond the justices
themselves, that come from external indicia of the national
moral values that are extant or emerging in our society. The
Court must also recognize the limits of its competence; it
should be reluctant to disturb the policy decisions reached by
majoritarian institutions unless it is confident that those decisions conflict with contemporary national values or with an
evident pattern of developing American thought. Most important, the Court must be candid in its opinions, describing the
norms that it is invoking and the source from which those
norms have been drawn. If Congress or the American people
were ever to view the Court's reasoning as amounting to nothing more than an elaborate constitutional charade, the death of
the Court's vital function would not be far behind.
Unlike Professor Perry, I call not for a "fierce" judicial activism, 273 but rather for a cautious, restrained judicial role that
recognizes its countermajoritarian dangers as well as the fundamental benefits that might result from its exercise. I also call
for equal caution and restraint from Congress, the majoritarian
institution that has the power to derail the Court's nonoriginalist mission. In the end, the future of judicial review deappellate jurisdiction during Reconstruction was only a glancing blow.
Within a year or so, the Court handed down a series of unprecedented
decisions holding unconstitutional Congressional statutes which made
greenbacks legal tender, exceeded the commerce power, and taxed
state instrumentalities. Judicial review would never have flourished
had the people been opposed to it. They have opposed only its exercise in particular cases, but not the power itself. They have the sover-eign power to abolish it outright or hamstring it by constitutional
amendment. The President and Congress could bring the Court to
heel even by ordinary legislation. The Court's membership, size,
funds, staff, rules of procedure, and enforcement agencies are subject
to the control of the "political" branches. Judicial review, in fact, exists by the tacit consent of the governed.
Levy, JudicialReview, History, and Democracy: An Introduction, in JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE SUPREME CouRT 1, 12 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
273. See M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 138.
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pends upon a unique combination of judicial and congressional
wisdom. The Supreme Court can further the cause of moral
growth through the exercise of nonoriginalist review, but it
likewise can lose all that has been gained by stepping beyond
the bounds of its tenuous congressional license.274 For its part,
Congress can either join as a silent partner in the Supreme
Court's endeavor or it can disable the Court beyond repair by
exercising its dormant power to control the Court's jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have examined the strengths and weaknesses of Professor Perry's constitutional theory and have attempted to build on Perry's work by suggesting an alternative
model of nonoriginalist review. The model I have proposed
contemplates a more restricted version of review than does
Perry's and a more limited congressional oversight of the
Supreme Court's constitutional decision making. As such, it
cautions restraint on the part of both governmental branches, a
mutual restraint through which the practice of nonoriginalist
review can be permitted to continue its important function in
27 5
our society.
To date, the Supreme Court and Congress have exercised
the necessary restraint, thereby perpetuating the uniquely
American constitutional experience:
[T]he American Republic, alone among democracies in modern or ancient times, created and continued an independent judicial branch of
government. By and large this independence-an independence of
274. Some would contend that the Court has already gone too far, pushing
Congress to the brink of exercising its jurisdiction-limiting power. See
Cohodas, supra note 235, at 947 (" 'The Supreme Court brought this on itself.
It's the abuse of power of judicial review ....
The court has been eroding the
deliberative process of Congress. They've precipitated the crisis.' ") (quoting
Sen. East); Ervin, supra note 40, at 1536 ("Members of Congress who revere
the Constitution are likely to demand that this power be exercised with frequency in the future if activist Supreme Court justices do not stop substituting
their personal notions for constitutional precepts, while pretending to interpret the Constitution."); Marcus, supra note 40, at 24 (" 'If the court is going to
get into the game of legislating-which is in effect what it is doing in decisions
like these-it should not be surprised if Congress slaps it back.' ") (quoting
Carl Anderson, aide to Sen. Helms).
275. Given the overriding importance of the issue I have addressed in this
Article, I will consider my work a success if I have contributed in even a small
way to an understanding of that issue and how it might properly be resolved.
The legitimacy of nonoriginalist review is an issue so fundamental that it cannot be given too much attention. The debate should continue, and I have no
doubt that it will.
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custom, tradition, and mutual restraint as much as of law-has served
our country well over the past two centuries.
I believe that we weaken this proud tradition at our peril.2 7 6

Those who support nonoriginalist judicial review can do no better than to work for a continuation of the mutual restraint that
now prevails.277 We can hope for nothing more.

276. 125 CONG. REc. S7644 (1979) (statement of Sen. Durkin). Senator
Leahy agrees:
Underlying the success of the system over nearly 200 years, is a
strong notion of comity and accommodation among the branches. The
self-restraint exercised by each branch is strengthened by genuine
concern about destroying that sense of comity, just as one is careful to
nurture a fruitful relationship with a good neighbor.
128 CONG. REc. S10857 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
277. As Senator Wiley has observed: "What we must in our time depend
upon, and what without a shadow of a doubt the Founding Fathers expected
we would depend upon, is the moral sense of the legislators, the moral sense
of the Supreme Court itself, the American genius for compromise without friction." 104 CONG. REc. S18683 (1958) (statement of Sen. Wiley).

